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1.  The  European  Monetary  System:  An  evaluation  for  the first  four  years 
An  evaluation of  the  first  four  years  of  the  EMS  is  necessary  in 
order  to  answer  the  question of  the  drachma's  adhesion  to  the  EMS. 
Through  this  evaluation it  can  be  seen  if, and  to  what  extent,  the  EMS 
achieved  its aims  and  what  would  be  the  advantages  and  disadvantages  for 
the  Greek  economy  of  the  drachma's  adhesion to the  EMs(1). 
The  purpose  of  the  EMS  is to  create  European  monetary  stability,  through 
the  implementation  of  certain exchange  rate,  credit  and  resource  transfer po-
Licies,  backed  up  and  guided  by  a  new  polici of  coordination  aimed  at  pro-
<2>  mating  the  convergence  of  economic  policies and  performances  • 
Thus,  the  EMS  was  conceived as  an  answer  to existing  international  mo-
netary  instability and  was  a  compromise  solution between  fixed  <central 
rates  of  the  EMS)  and  floating  exchange  rates  <margins  of  fluctuation  around 
the  central  rates).  The  fixed  element  in  the  EMS  resulted  from  dissatisfaction 
with  the  experience  of  floating  (or  managed  floating)  after the  breakdown 
of  the  Bretton  Woods  System.  Contrary  to expectations  resulting  from  the  mo-
netarist  theory  that  was  the  most  important  proponent  of  floating,  floating 
rates  have  not  simply  proved  to  be  no  panacea,  but  their operation  has  dis-
appointed  reasonable  expectations:  Floating  rates  did  not  secure  independence 
for  domestic  policy(3).  The  flexible  element  in  the  EMS  was  introduced  in 
order  to  ease  temporary  tensions  within  the  system,  thus  avoiding  the  need 
for  too  frequent  realignments  of  the  central  rates. 
* 
I  would  Like  to  thank  Prof.  Dr.  G.  Demopoulos,  currently economic  advisor 
at  the  European  Commission,  for  his  valuable  comments  on  the preparation of 
this study,  as  well  as  Dr.  K.  Revelas,  Mr.  Th.  Papaspyrou  and  Mr.  G.  Floras 
of  the  European  Commission  for  many  stimulating discussions.  I  am  responsible 
for  any  remaining  errors. - 3  -
The  following  solutions  were  possible  for  the  EMS: 
<1>  The  introduction of  a  new  currency  created  ex  nihilo and  which 
would  form  a  kind  of  screen  between  national  currencies  and  third 
countries'  currencies.  This  new  currency  would  be  created  in-
dependently  from  the  natiOI"lal  curren'(;i-es.  Various  proposals  have 
been  put  forward  as  to the  form  this  curr·ency  would  take,  among 
them  a  proposal  to  introduce  the  ECU  with  a  stability guarantee. 
(i.e.  the  price  level  of  a  representative  commodity  basket  would 
be  kept  constant  in  terms  of  ECU's). 
(2)  The  introduction of  a  currency  formed  as  a  basket  from  the existing 
national  currencies  of  the  Member  States.  This  currency  is  not 
created  independently  but  dep~  on  the~reserves (dollar and  gold) 
of  the  Member  States.  Its "value"  is dependent  on  the  "values''of 
h  .  d (4)  t  e  currenc1es  concerne  • 
For  political  reasons  the  second  solution  was  chosen. 
An  evaluation  can  be  undertaken  through  a  comparison  of  the  aims  and 
l  h.  d<S>  W  d'  .  .  h  .  .  1  M  b'  resu  ts  ac  1eve  •  e  can  1st1ngu1s  two  ma1n  a1ms:  •  onetary sta  ,_ 
lity:  This  comprises  an  internat  (prices  and  interest  rates)  and  an  ex-
ternal  element  (exchange  rates>;  2.  Convergence,  which  can  be  measured  by 
the  development  of  various  economic  indicators,  like the  GNP,  employment-
unemployment  rates.  As  can  be  seen  from  tables  1  and  2,  inflation was  very 
uneven  in  the  EC  Member  States.  Price differentials within  the  EC  are  today 
widerthan  those  recorded  on  average  during  the  period  1974-197~following 
the first oil price  shock.  In  1982,  taking  only  the  Member  States effectively 
participating  in  the  EMS  exchange  rate mechanism,  there  was  a  difference of 
15.4%  (price deflator of  GOP  at  market  prices>  between  the  country  with  the 
lowest  inflation,  Germany,  and  the  country  in  which  inflation was  highest, 
Ireland.  The  inflation rate  in  France  is more  than  twice  <12.4%)  and  in 
Italy more  than  three  times  C17D5%)  the  rate of  Germany  <4.8%).  Thus  it can 
be  seen  that  up  till now  the  EMS  has  not  been  successful  in achieving greater 
monetary  stability and  reducing  inflation  rates. 
As  can  be  seen  from  tables  3  and  4,  interest  rates  showed  also dif-
ferences,  both  concerning short-term,  as  well  as  long-term  interest  rates
1
. - 4  -
although  the  differences  were  not  so  marked,  varying  in  1981  from  10.4% 
(long-term  interest  rates>  in  Germany  to  20.6%  in  Italy.  The  same  was 
also  true  for  short~erm interest  rates~  although  the differences  here 
were  even  smaller.  (From  12.4%  in  Germany  to  19  0%  in  Italy). 
The  relative  failure of  the  EMS  to  achieve  more  monetary  stability 
must  be  seen  in  the  context  of  the  short  observation  period  (only  four 
years)  and  is  al~o due  in part  to  adverse  external  conditions,  such  as 
the  economic  recession  and  the  second  oil  shock  of  1979.  There  is  the 
problem  of  the  isolation of  factors  influencing monetary  development  in 
the  Member  States.  Also,  it is  well  known  that  in  a  situation of  rising 
inflation  rates~  as  existed up  to  1982,  divergences  in  inflation  rates  be-
tween  countries  tend  to  be  accentuated.  These  differences  might  have  been 
even  more  pronounced  in  the  absence  of  the  EMS. 
Towards  the  end  of  1982  and  beginning of  1983,  inflation  rates  dece-
lerated  in all  Member  States.  If  this  trend  continues,  then  a  greater  mo-
netary stability and  convergence  can  be  achieved  in the  future. 
Concerning  the  external  element  of  monetary  stability, the  exchange 
rates,  the  EMS  was  more  successful.  Although  beyond  a  certain threshhold 
the  divergences  in  inflation rates will  have  an  impact  on  the  nominal  exchange 
rates  of  the  EMS  currencies,  necessitating  the  realignment  of  the  central 
rates,  there  has  been  a  reduction  in  the  very  short-term variability of  ex-
change  rates  between  the  currencies participating  in  the  EMS,  including  the 
Italian lira.  On  the other  hand,  the  exchange  rates  of  non-participating 
currencies  have  remained  highly volatile and  this  short-term instability has 
been  part  of  very  Large  long-term  fluctuations(6). 
The  fall  in effective  rates  in  countries  such  as  France,  Italy and  Ireland, 
which  have  experienced more  rapid  inflation  than  the other  countries,  has 
been  contained  within  narrower  limits  during  the  period of operation of  the 
EMS  than  the  previous  period,  as  can  be  seen  from  Table Sb. 
The  adjustments  in  central  rates  have  only  partly  compensated  for  the 
movement  in  relative costs  and  prices.  This  has  resulted  in  a  gradual  real - 5  -
appreciation of  these  currencies,  in particular  the  Irish pound,  <as  can  be 
seen  from  Table 6). 
The  establishment  of  the  EMS  has  thus  put  an  end  to  the  phenomena  of 
overadjustment  previously  observed  and  has  made  for  a  return  to  more  normal 
conditions. 
It  may  be  concluded  that  concerning  the external  element  of monetary 
stability,  i.e.  exchange  rate stability,  the  EMS  has  succeeded  in  reestablishing 
a  more  orderly  structure of  exchange  rates  between  participants and  in  reducing 
volatility and  this despite  the  instability of  the~·international monetary  en-
vironment,  the  disruptions  caused  by  the  second  oil  shock  and  persistent di-
vergences  in  nominal  variables.  But,  as  the  Commission  remarks;  "This  achieve-
ment,  the  fruit  of  an  initial phase  during  which  order  was  restored,  will  be 
seriously  compromised  if greater  convergence  in economic  policies  is  not  es-
tablished.  Greater  exchange  rate stability  requires  more  moderate  and  more 
closely  aligned  growth  of  nominal  variables,  and  this  achievment  cannot  without 
damage  be  put  off  any  Longer.  Failing  ~his, the  EMS  would  change  in  nature 
d  b  h.  .  . L  L.  f  .  .  II(?)  an  ecome  somet  1ng  s1m1  ar  to a  craw  1ng  peg  system  o  par1t1es. 
Exchange  rate stability was  not  envisaged  by  the  creators of  the  EMS 
as  an  objective  in  itself, but  as  a  means  toward  and  a  result  of  the  convergence 
of  the  Member  countries'  national  economic  performances  towards  internal  sta-
bility, although  exchange  rate stability is a  desirable goal  and  it has  helped 
to  sustain business  and  trade  among  the  EMS  members.  With  respect  to  convergence, 
the  EMS  has  not  produced  very  satisfactory results.  As  mentioned  above,  the 
inflation  rates  diverged  strongly,  contrary  to expectations.  In  a  system  Like 
the  EMS  it  was  expected  that  a  country  whose  costs  and  prices  would  diverge  up-
wards  from  its partner's  average,  WCA.Jld  gradually  lose  its competitiveness  and  ex-
perience  a  downward  pressure on  its currency,  would,  under  the  EMS  mechanism, 
adopt  a  stricter monetary  policy  to defend  its exchange  rate.  This  would,  at 
the  same  time,  help  to stabilize its costs  and  prices.  Thus,  under  normal 
circumstances,  the exchange  rate mechanism  and  the  instruments  associated 
with  it would  have  helped  to bring about  a  greater  convergence  of  inflation 
(8)  rates - 6  -
In  fact  this  did  not  happen,  because  the  Member  States  with  high 
inflation preferred not  to  follow  restrictive policies,  but  to devalue 
their  currencies  through  a  realignment  of  their central  rates.  They  chose 
not  to  use  the  financial  mechanisms  of  the  EMS,  some  of  which  are  coupled 
with  policy  measures  to  be  undertaken  by  the  borrowing  country,  but  tore-
(9) 
sort  instead  to  market  borrowing 
Due  to  the  short  observation  period and  adverse  international  eco-
nomic  situation,  it  is  very  difficult  to evaluate  the effects of  the  EMS  on 
the  convergence  of  real  variables.  Measured  by  GOP  per  head  in  ECU's,  the 
absolute  gap  between  the  richest  (in  1978  Denmark  and  in  1982  Germany)  and 
the  poorest  EMS  member  (in  both  years  Ireland)  remained  about  the  same,  but 
the  relative difference  was  reduced  from  about  2.9  to 1,  to  about  2_1  to  1. 
Again,  it  is  impossible  to  isolate the  effect  of  the  EMS  upon  this  trend 
because  the  EMS  influences  real  growth  in  a  roundabout  way,  i.e.  through 
the  promotion  of  trade,  and  amelioration of  capital  flows. 
The  EMS  introduced  the  following  new  elements  which  distinguishes  it 
from  its predecessors:  1.  The  divergence  indicator;  2.  An  increase  in  the 
credit  mechanisms;  3.  The  possibility of  wider  fluctuation  margins  for 
weaker  currencies  like  the  Italian  lira;  4.  Coordination  and  common  accord 
for  the  realignments  of  participating currencies;  5.  The  existence of 
central  rates.  These  new  elements  were  expected  to  guarantee  the  smooth 
working  of  the  EMS. 
The  main  importance  of  the  divergence  indicator  is  that  it  represents 
for  the  first  time  in  Community  and  world  monetary  history an  agreement  on 
( 1  0)  the  use  of  an  objective  indicator  as  a  trigger for  policy  coordination 
Th  .  d .  .  .  .  .  k .  l  h  h  (  11 )  .  e  1n  1cator  1s  asymmetr1c  1n  1ts  wor  1ng,  as  Vaube  as  s  own  •  An  1n-
dicator  that  results  in  the adaptation towards  an  average,  without  an  indication 
as  to whether  the national  inflation  rate  is higher or  lower  than  the  average, 
is  inadequate  to  combat  inflation.  The  warning  signal  of  the  indicator does 
not  function  when  two  currencies  with  a  small  weight  move  towards  their 
respective  intervention points,  while  the other  currencies  remain  near  the 
middle  of  the  two  extreme  currencies.  The  two  extreme  currencies  then  reach 
th ..  t  t'  .  .  h  h  .  .  h  h  f  .  < 12)  e1r  1n  erven  1on  po1nts  w1t  out  av1ng  passed  the1r  t  res  hold  o  d1vergence  . - 7  -
Also,  although  the  divergence  indicator  is an  indicator  for  under-
taking  policy  measures,  there  is  no  compulsion  for  the  Member  State or 
States  whose  currency  diverges  to  undertake  such  measures.  Still,  in 
practice,  the  Member  States did  intervene  in  such  cases,  although  the 
time-lag  between  the  signal  and  the  intervention  was  sometimes  quite 
Lengthy. 
Vaubel  also criticises  the  fact  that  although  the  divergence  indicator 
works  as  a  presumption  to undertake  policy measures,  the  Member  State,whose 
currency  deviates, can  choose  its own  measures  in  freedom,  since  there 
are  no  agreed  measures  that  must  be  undertaken.  It  can  choose  either 
monetary  policy  measures  or  an  adaptation of  the.exchange  rate. 
If one  country  uses  the  financial  facilities of  the  EMS,  it could  try 
to  reduce  its financial  burden  after borrowing,  by  devaluating  its own 
currency.  This  would  reduce  the  ECU-value  o_f  the  credit,  since  the  national 
currency  is participating  in  the  ECU.  <A  devaluation of  the  national  currency 
devalues  also  the  ECU,  to a  lesser extent).  This  is an  inflationary element 
in  the  system. 
Also,  the  EMS  has  an  inflationary bias  for  the  following  reasons: 
"Interventions  according  to the  rules  of  the parity grid always  req..~ire net 
money  creation  in  the  surplus  country  while  there  is  no  corresponding  con-
traction of  the  money  supply  in  the deficit  countries;  apart  from  the  primary 
effect of sterilizing those  sums  of  the deficit  currencies  bought  with  the 
surplus  currencies  by  way  of  intervention.  This  primary  deflationary effect 
can  easily  be  compensated  by  reflationary measures of  the monetary  authorities 
in  the  deficit  countries. 
It  is  improbable  that  the  surplus  countries  can  react  by  compensatory 
deflation.  Furthermore,  the  large  facilities of  the  EMS  can  be  used  to 
borrow  from  the  surplus  countries of  the  EMS  and  at  the  same  time  to  inflat~ 
them.  If  the  so-called divergence  indicator  is used  to put  pressure  on  the 
surplus  countries  this  might  sometimes  lead  to more  inflation in  the  suprlus - 8  -
countries  instead of  revaluation,  which  is  always  a  political decision 
against  one's  own  export  and  import  competing  industries.  In  Germany 
it is not  the  central  bank,  but  the  government,  which  is  responsible 
for  changing  a  parity.  Thus,  new  exchange  rates  are  fixed  by  a  political 
institution,  which  is  extremely  exposed  to  economic  pressure groups.  Con-
sequently  currencies are,  as  a  rule,  revalued  too  late and  by  too  little, 
leading  to more  inflation. 
In  the  EMS  there  is not  the  slightest  element  of  an  automatic  adaptation 
to  the  stability standard of  the most  stable  currency.  All  regulations  work 
in  the  opposite direction.  If the  OM  should  incidentally  be  the  most  stable 
currency,  the  chances  are  high,  that  instead of  educating  the others.it will 
Lose  some  of  its traditional  strength.  The  only_hope  left  for  German  po-
licy  is  the  autonomous  decision of  the  other  member  countries  to stabilise 
h 
.  .  .  h  .  .  ,.(13)  t  e1r  currenc1es  1n  t  e1r  own  1nterest. 
The  passage  quoted  above  expresses  well  the  strongly  stability-minded 
German  reservations  on  the  EMS.  These  fears  proved  to  be  exaggerated. 
It  cannot  be  shown  that  the  EMS  helped  to accelerate  inflation.  The  credit 
facilities of  the  EMS  are  not  inflationary because  while  they  do  create money 
in  the  surplus  country,  they  also  reduce  money  supply  in  the deficit  country, 
not  only  through  the  intervention of  the  central  bank  but  also  through  capital 
outflow  in  the  expectation  of  devaluation  by  the  weaker  country.  Furthermore, 
medium-term  financial  assistance  is  conditional  and  requires  that  the  borrowing 
country  undertake  measures  of  monetary  discipline.  This  has  been  the  reason 
why  the deficit  EMS  countries  preferred not  to  make  use  of  this facility but 
to  resort  to market  borrowing  at  a  higher  cost.  It  can  be  said  that  if the 
members  of  the  EMS  made  use  of  the  credit  facilities, this would  result  in more, 
not  less,  monetary  discipline  and  Less  inflation  in  the  higher  inflation countries 
Moreover,  the  use  of  the  divergence  indicator  has  apparently  not  produced 
more  inflation  in  Germany,  since the  German  government  chose  to  revaluate 
whenever  the danger  of  imported  inflation appeared.  Also,  due  to the  fact 
that  the  decision  to appreciate or  devalue  is a  decision of  the government 
and  because  any  devaluation  is seen  negatively  by  the  public opinion of  the 
devaluing  country,  the  governments  do  lie under  a  "moral"  constraint  not  to 
devalue  too  often and  to  try to pursue  more  stability oriented monetary  policies. - 9  -
Ttlis  seemed  to  be  the  case during  the  last  realignment  of  March  1983, 
where  the  French  and  Italian governments  tried to  keep  devaluation  wihtin 
narrow  Limits.  In  fact,  the  French  government  undertook  a  more  restrictive 
economic  policy after the devaluation. 
Although  the  criticism that  the  EMS  credit  mechanism  can  have  some  infla-
tionary  conseq;ences  is valid,  this  Logical  observation  seems  to  be  of  questionablt 
relevance  in  the  current  environment  and  insofar  as  countries  share  the 
common  objective of  reducing  their  rates of  inflation.  Because  governments 
have  a  common  objective,  the  EMS  has  proven  to  be  stable as  an  institution 
and  it is a  measure  of  its success  that  no  participant  country  has  chosen 
to  withdraw.  A country  that  withdraws  has  no  immediate  set  of  arrangements 
that  it  can  adopt.  It  can  only  move  back  to a  system  of  managed  flexibility,  ... 
in partial  reaction  to  which  it decided  to  join the  EMS.  The  absence  of  any 
intermediate alternatives  provides  an  incentive for  participating countries 
to  pursue  monetary  policies  which  are  not  inconsistent  with  the  survival  of 
the  EMS."  (14) 
A further  criticism of  the  EMS  concerns  the  ECU  as  a basket  currency, 
if it is  intended  to  be  a  starting point  for  a  common  European  currency. 
Such  an  ECU,  if allowed  to circulate as  an  exchange  medium  among  private 
persons  or  commercial  banks  of  the  Member  States,  could substitute the  weak 
and  most  inflationary currencies,  but  it could  not  substitute the  strong 
currencies,  since  these  will  always  be  stronger  than  the  ECU,  which  contains 
weak  currency  ingredients  as  well.  So,  the  ECU  is  inadequate  for  the  future 
k  f  l .  .  E  <15)  tas  o  rea  1s1ng  a  common  uropean  currency 
An  advantage,  but  also a  condition  for  the  further  functioning  of  the 
EMS,  is  the  need  to  closely  coordinate national  monetary  policies.  Shortly 
after its  introduction,  Thygessen  remarked:  "The  EMS,  if it is to have  any 
significance,  must  imply  above  all  a  willingness  to  make  exchange  rate policy 
increasingly  a  matter of  joint decision  and  to use  that  policy  instrument 
less  than  in  the past.  The  policy  coordination triggered  by  the divergence 
indicator  will  not  typically point  to an  exchange-rate  adjustment  as  the 
first  line of defense,  but  to  domestic  instruments  for  stabilisation  ... <16> - 10  -
The  coordination  of  monetary  policies  met,  in  fact,  with  mixed 
success:  Exchange  rate  policy,  as  realised during  the  seven  realign-
ments  of  the  EMS  central  rates,  was  a  matter  of  joint decision,  but  on 
the  other  hand,.the  policy  coordination,triggered  by  the  divergence  in-
dicator,had  as  a  consequence  the  adjustment  of  exchange-rates  and  not 
the  use  of  domestic  instruments  for  stabilisation, at  least  in  cases 
where  this  would  require  a  change  in  economic  policy. 
This  may  be  due  to  the  lack  of  any  formal  decisions  and  guidelines 
for  policy action.  Such  guidelines  should  be  informative to  the parti-
cipating  countries  in  setting the  Limits  of  accommodation  to differences 
in  behaviour,  in  particular with  respect  to  inflation  rates.  They  should 
be  sufficiently  clear  to  be  interpreted  by  private-market participants  in 
such  a  way  that  expectations  in  the  market  support,  rather  than  counteract, 
the efforts of  the authorities.  "Encouraging  caution  in  the divergent 
countries  by  not  giving  them  the  right,  but  only  a  possibility,  to adjust 
their central  rates,  should  typically yield greater  stability  in  the  EMS 
rate structure and  more  rapid  policy  convergence  than  to set  up  apparently 
f  .  h  b  .  d  .  h  f l  . b. l.  t  II (  17)  irm  rates  which  w1Ll  anyway  ave  to  e  1nterprete  w1t  ex1  1  1  y. 
A serious  ommission  of  the  EMS  is  the  Lack  of  a  common  policy  towards 
third  countries  and  in particular the dollar.  The  EMS  agreement  provided  also 
for  coordination of  exchange-rate  policies vis-a-vis  third countries  and  as 
far  as  possible  a  concertation with  the  monetary  authorities of  these  countries, 
but  this  has  been  neglected.  It  can  be  argued  that  to  some  extent  it is  in 
fact  the  German  Bundesbank  that dictates  the  common  policy  towards  the dollar, 
because  the  DM  is the  key  currency  in  the  EMS.  The  other  EMS  currencie~ po-
sition towards  the dollar  is determined either  by  the  inaction or  by  the  con-
certed  interventions of  the Bundesbank  and  the  Federal  Reserve.  When  the dol-
lar weakens,  so  that  short-term capital  takes  refuge  in  the  DM,  tensions  be-
tween  the  DM  and  other  EMS  currencies  tend  to appear.  These  speculative  flows 
of  capital,originating outside  the  EM~induce strong  currency  countries  within 
the  system,  like  Germany,  to  intervene  in order  to prevent  appreciations of 
their  currencies  beyond  the  fluctuation  margins  of  the  EMS.  A concern  that - 11  -
was  often expressed  in  Germany,  was  that  such  interventions  would  Lead 
the  Bundesbank  to  expand  the  monetary  base  beyond  what  seemed  to  the 
German  monetary  authorities  to  be  compatible  with  internal  stability. 
In  fact  the  volume  of  those  interventions  was  never  such  as  to pre-
vent  the  objectives of  internal  monetary  growth  from  being  achieved  in  the 
intervening countries,  especially  since  the  Bundesbank  used  sterilization 
policies  successfully. 
Still, policy  coordination  towards  the dollar  and  other  countries 
is desirable  <18).  This  could  be  achieved directly or  indirectly. 
Indirectly,  if other  EMS  currencies  were  equally-attractive from  the  point 
of  view  of  their  financial  stability,  international  investors  would  spread 
their short-term assets  more  equally  over  these  currencies  and  occasional 
flights  from  or  to  the dollar  would  not  be  so  massively  concentrated on  the 
OM.  It  follows  that  in  the  long-run  a  bett~r convergence  of  economic  per-
formances  within  the  Community  might  be  conducive  to  a  more  balanced  common 
policy  towards  the dollar. 
Directly,  a  coordiantion of  policies vis-a-vis  the dollar  can  be  also 
pursued.  J.  van  Ypersele  has  proposed  to  replace  part  or all of  the existing 
bilateral  swap  agreements  by  a  FECOM-Federal  Reserve  swap  credit  Line,  to 
be  used  so  as  to stabilize the  exchange  market  within  the  EMS  instead of 
creating  tensions,  to  the  extent  that  the  currency  used  by  the  FED  for  re-
imbursing  the  FECOM  need  not  be  the  same  as  the  one  borrowed  for  interventian'19). - 12  -
2.  The  Greek  economy:  Recent  developments  and  economic  policy 
As  happened  with  all  Member  States,  Greece's  economy  was  hit  hard  by 
the  international  recession which  accentuated  the  existing structural  and 
.  l  d"  "l"b  .  (2Q)  Th  bl  f  d"  .  h  .  reg1ona  1sequ1  1  r1a  e  pro  em  o  a  JUStlng  t  e  economy  to  1ts 
environment  is mainly  a  structural one,  because  no  Long-term  improvement 
in  production  and  competitiveness  is  possible without  a  long  and  systematic 
effort  to  increase  domestic  supply,  which  involves  restoring  high  investment 
ratios.  This  must  be  combined  with  vigorous  measures  to  combat  inflation, 
which  presently distorts  the  allocation of  production  factors  and  so  inevi-
tably  hampers  structural  change. 
The  policy  measures  of  the  present  government  try  to achieve  these  two 
aims.  These  measures  will  be  further  specified  in  the  five-year  pla~ now 
in  preparation.  By  combining  a  Large  increase  in  the  Lowest  incomes,  early 
in  1982,  with  price  controls  on  necessities  and  a  major  selective  increase 
in  taxation,  this  policy aims  to  stimulate  consumer  demand  while  slowing 
down  price  increases.  An  indexation  system  of  adapting  incomes  and  pensions 
has  been  introduced.  Furthermore,  another  aim  of  the  policy  is to  reduce 
aggregate  domestic  credit  as  a  proportion of  GOP,  by  vigorously  restraining 
the  expanding  trend  of  the  public  sector deficit.  Lastly,  the  policy  aims 
at  encouraging  the  recovery  of  investment  through  a  selective credit  policy 
wnich  has  succeeded  in  keeping  real  interest  rates at  a  very  Low  Level,  and 
~Y completing  the  system  of  a  very  varied  range  of  sectoral  and  regional  aids. 
The  international  economic  crisis  is  a  constraint  that  Limits  the  go-
vernment's  freedom  in  economic  policy.  Greek  competitiveness,  based  on  unit 
Labour  cost,  decreased  by  17.5%  as  against  Greece's  19  most  important  com-
mercial  partners  and  by  26%  as  against  the  EC  during  the  Last  two  years.  In 
the  two  years  since  joining the  EEC,  Greece's  trade deficit  with  its  EC  partners 
has  doubled  to  S 2.5  billion,  while  its overall  trade deficit  in  the  first 
ten  months  of  1982,  was  S 4.9 billion.  This  was  due  in part  to the  structural 
weakness  of  the  Greek  economy  and  in part  to  increased demand  due  to the  higher 
incomes  of  the  lower  income  groups  after the  introduction of  indexation.  An  im-
portant  part  of  this additional  demand  could  not  be  satisfied by  domestic production 
and  had  to be  covered  by  imports.  Also,  Greek  industry  was  used  to a climate of  high - 13  -
protection  in  the  form  of  customs  duties  so  that  it suffered  through 
increased  EC  competition after  the  reduction of  custom  duties,  following 
accession. 
Exports  have  stagnated  so  far,  due  to  the  loss  in  competitiveness 
and  investment  has  shown  no  signs  of  picking up.  Moreover,  it has  proved 
impossible  to  reduce  liquidity because  the  public  sector deficit  could 
not  be  restrained,  as  far  as  was  hoped.  The  real  growth  rate  was  negative 
in  1981  <-0.7%)  and  is estimated at  De?%  for  1982  and  1.  9%  for  1983(21 ). 
Faced  with  this situation,  the  government  had  to  take  some  drastic  and, 
to  a  certain degree,  unpopular,  but  necessary,  m~asures.  The  first  was  the 
depreciation of  the  drachma  by  15,5%  in  January  1983,  in  an  effort  to  re-
store  the  equilibrium of  the  balance  of  payments  and  to offset  the effect 
of  inflation differentials on  Greece's  competitiveness.  The  second  was 
the  introduction of  a  more  restrictive policy  through  the  postponement  of 
any  increase  in  wages  and  salaries  for  1983.  During  1983,  no  increases  in 
wages  and  salaries will  be  given,  which  means  that  available  real  incomes 
will  decrease,  taking  into account  an  anticipated  rate of  inflation of  about 
20%.  This  form  of  incomes  policy  is  e~pected to  have  two  effects:  on  the 
supply  side  it will  reduce  cost  and  so  increase  the  competitiveness  of  Greek 
products  and  on  the  demand  side it will  reduce  demand  and  therefore also 
imports,  helping  the  balance  of  payments.  A further  measure  was  the  intro-
duction of  import  restrictions  for  some  products  which  will  be  kept  at  their 
1982  Levels,  in order  to protect  domestic  production of  some  hard-hit  sectors. 
The  Commission  proposed  the  following  policy  lines  for  Greece(22): 
The  present  tight  policy  should  be  continued  because  it is essential  to 
control  inflation if the  financial  conditions  are  to  be  established,  to 
allow  the  major  investment  effort  required  for  the  transformation of  the  ~co­
nomic  structure.  Policy measures  should  try  to  ensure  that  nominal  trends 
begin  to  slow  down  in 1983.  Also,  efforts  to  restrain the  rise  in  incomes 
<i.e.  incomes  policies)  must  cqntinue.  In  applying  the  index-linking  me-
chanism,  the  disadvantages  of  excessively  narrowing  the  overall  range  of - 14  -
wages  and  salaries  should  be  avoided. 
Price  controls  must  also  be  continued  in order  to  prevent  excessive 
price  increases  that  accelerate  inflation.  The  liquidity ratio  in  the 
economy  must  be  further  reduced  by  bringing  the  net  public  sector borrowing 
requirement  to  below  10X  of  GOP  through  cuts  in  current  expenditure  and 
increases  in  public  service  charges,  by  tightening  credit  controls  and  by 
encouraging  stable savings.  To  achieve  the  Last  aim,  interest  rates  can  no 
longer  be  kept  at  an  artificially  low  real  Level  and  more  account  will  have 
to  be  taken  of  market  conditions  when  fixing  interest  rates. 
In  particular areas,  the  following  developments  took  place: 
The  central  government  budget  deficit  Cincluding~government trading  accounts) 
was  virtually stable up  to  1981,  at  around  5-6%  of  GOP.  In  1981  the deficit 
doubled,  increasing  to  12%  of  GDP.  This  resulted  in  an  acceleration of  in-
flation,  reaching  a  post-war  peak  of  24.4%.  <Private  consumption  price de-
flator).  The  new  socialist government  prepared  the  1982  budget  with  the 
aim  of  reducing  the deficit  to  9%  of  GOP.  This  budget  (adopted  by  Parliament 
in  April  1982)  provided  for  a  substantial  increase  in  revenue  (about  58,5%) 
to  come  from  the  following  sources:  1.  Indirect  taxation,  via  new  taxes  and 
the  increase  in existing ones;  2.  Direct  taxation,  via  new  taxes  and  the 
diminution of  tax  evasion;  3.  The  European  Agricultural  Guida~ce and 
Guarantee  Fund.  On  the  other  hand,  the  increase  in  expenditure  was  esti-
mated  at  35%,  resulting,  according  to  the  Commission's  estimates,  in  a  ge-
neral  government  requirement  equivalent  to  9.2%  of  GOP  in  1982,  as  against 
10ft1%  in  1981. 
With  regard  to  the  labour  marketF  in  the past,  the  Low  official  rate 
of  unemployment  <which  concealed  substantial  underemploymen~ in particular 
in agriculture),  was  used  as  an  argument  for  not  undertaking  specific  em-
ployment  measures.  The  new  government  (due  in part  also to  rising  un-
employment  in  Greece,  estimated at  7-8%  in  1982),  announced  a  series of 
measures  designed  to  improve  the  operation of  the  Labour  Administration, - 15  -
as  well  as  the  improved  collection of statistics.  The  first  economic 
policy  package  was  introduced  at  the  end  of  1981,  and  included a  re-
duction  of  the  Legal  working  week  to  41  hours  and  the  introduction of 
four  weeks'  paid  holiday  for  everyone.  In  May  1982  it promulgated  the 
instrument  entitling private  sector workers  to  24  working  days•  holiday 
per  year. 
Further,  the  Commission  has  given  a  positive answer  to Greece's 
memorandum  concerning  some  special  problems  facing  the  Greek  economy 
.  <23)  after the  adhes1on  • 
; 
I - 16  -
3.  The  drachma's  adhesion  to  the  EMS 
3.1.  Greek  monetary  policy 
The  Greek  Banking  System  consists of:  1)  The  central  bank  (Bank 
of  Greece);  2)  22  commercial  banks,  10  of  which  are  Greek  and  12  foreign; 
3)  3  investment  banks  (The  Hellenic  Industrial  Development  Bank,  which  is 
a  state-owned  institution,  The  Investment  Bank  and  The  National  Investment 
Bank  for  Industrial  Development,  which  are  private banks>;  4)  5  specialised 
credit  institutions. 
Non-banking  institutions do  not  play  an  important  role  in  financing 
investments  mainly  due  to  underdeveloped  capital market,  so  that  the 
banking  system  is  the  most  important  instituti~nalised market  in  mobilising 
and  allocating private and  public  financial  resources. 
Until  1982  the  economic  policies to be  followed  were  determined  by 
the  Currency  Committee,  which  was  abolished  by  the  new  government  in  1982 
and  was  replaced  by  the  Council  of  competent  ministers,  or  by  the  minister 
of  National  Economy  a Lone.  :·.· 
Before  1982  the Bank  of  Greece  was  responsible  only  for  the  im-
plementation of  the  monetary  and  credit  policies  and  the  preservation of 
the  country's  monetary  stability.  But  due  to the  structure of  the  Greek 
economy ..  the  existing  institutional  framework  exerted  high  pressure  on 
the  Bank  of  Greece  to  increase the  monetary  aggregates,  such  as  the  money 
supply,  at  rates  that ~red the  aims  of  economic  development  and  sta-
bilisation.  Monetary  policy  was  implemented  in  the  form  of  a  credit  po-
licy  aimed  towards  the  availability of  credit  for  purposes  of  economic 
development.  This  was  done  through  a  complex  system  of  secondary  reserves 
for  different  credit  lines'24).  Further,  money  supply  and  the  monetary  base 
responded  to  changes  in  the  stock  of  Treasury bills, so  that  the monetary 
base  lost  its quality  as  a  policy variable  in  the  hands  of  the  monetary 
authorities,  who  thus  became  subservient  to budgetary  policy.  This  also 
contradicted the  monetary  authorities'  policy  in affecting aggregate de-
mand  by  controlling the  money  supply  in order  to attain price stability or 
to prevent  price  level  accelerations. - 17  -
The  controls  over  the availability of  credit,  coupled  with  arti-
f .  .  ll  l  (  d  .  )  .  ( 25 )  d  f f  1c1a  y  ow  an  negat1ve  1nterest  rates  pro  uce  perverse  e  ects 
on  the  desired objectives of  economic  development  and  stabilisation, 
because  this policy: 
(1)  eliminates  competition  and  leads  to  an  ineffective allocation of 
<26)  resources  ; 
<2>  favours  Large  establishments  at  the  expense  of  small  and  medium-
size  establishments  thus  ma~ing them  less efficient; 
<3>  reduces  the  self-financing of all establishments  and  thus  places 
the  burden  on  the  credit  institutions; 
(4)  establishes  low  rates  of  return  and  consequently  a  low-risk  investment 
behaviour  on  behalf  of  the  banking  system.  This  investment  behaviour 
obviously  Leads  banks  to discriminate against  less  wealthy  economic 
units.  Hence,  the  argument  that  low  interest  rates  on  bank  credit 
help  the  Less  wealthy  economic  units,  thus  maximizing  the  social  welfare, 
is questionable.  Furthermore,  as  long  ~~ credit  is  rationed  by  price, 
everyone  has  access  to  it at  a  price,  but  once  it is  rationed  in other 
ways  access  depends  on  meeting  certain quality critetia  <such  as  good 
balance  sheet  ratios)  and  on  nepotism,  personal  contacts, etc.  These 
things  do  not  help  the  small  firms  or  the  poor; 
(5)  keeps  interest  rates  probably  well  below  the  levels  actually  determined 
by  demand  and  supply  conditions  and  thus  it enhances  the  inflationary 
pressures; 
(6)  requires  an  effective administration  to  check  the  good  use  of  credit. 
This  is  very difficult  to  be  accomplished; 
<7>  presupposes  that  the  central  bank's  discount  rate determines  the  interest 
rates  on  bank  credit.  That  is, the  discount  rate  is  taken  as  a  proxy 
for  the  banks'  credit  cost.  This  may  reduce  the  importance  of  the  discount 
rate as  a  relevant  monetary  policy tool; 
<B>  makes  interest  rates on  bank  credit  an  ineffective opportunity  cost,  since 
banks  are  not  allowed  to  extend  loans  unless  there  is an  increase  in 
their private deposits; 
(9)  assumes  that  monetary  policy actions  are  generated  through  controlling 
the  bank  credit.  That  is, monetary  policy  is  implemented  in  the  form 
.  (27)  of  a  credit  pol1cy. - 18  -
Many  European  and  other  countries  have  at  various  times  undertaken 
an  administrative  approach  to  monetary  policy  but  large  scale  econo-
metric  models  constructed  to analyse  the  impact  of  policy  in  various 
countries  show  no  superiority of  quantitative  credit  regulation over 
market-oriented  methods.  No  country  had  succeeded  in  developing  a  design 
of  direct  control of  Lending,  combining  effective control  of  aggregate 
credit  flows  with  the  changes  in  market  shares  and  in  specialisation which 
are  typically associated with  a  competitive  banking  sec~or.  Also,  these 
methods  were  gradually  Losing  their  impact  as  financial  institutions and 
their  customers  found  ways  around  the  restrictions.  Competition  was  not 
inactive,  but  it  took  forms  that  appeared  detrimental  to  the  institutions 
.  (28)  affected  by  the  regulat1ons  • 
The  new  government  reformed  the  institutional  framework  by  introducing 
a  Limit  of  7%  of  the  advances  given  by  the  Bank  of  Greece  as  a  percentage 
of  each  year's  budget.  This  will  reduce  the  inflationary pressure  that 
emanated  from  the  Bank  of  Greece's  increase of  money  supply  in order  to 
cover  budget  deficits.  Further  credit  needs  of  the  public  budget  will  be 
covered  by  interest  bearing  state obligations,  that  can  be  discounted  within 
limits at  the  Central  Bank.  The  complexity  of  the  credit  system  was  reduced 
b  h  .  d  .  f  .  l . f.  d  f  d.  ll  .  ( 29)  y  t  e  1ntro uct1on  o  a  s1mp  1  1e  system  o  ere  1t  a  ocat1on  • 
For  the  time  being,  the  drachma's  exchange  rate,  vis-a-vis various 
foreign  currencies..,  is  set  by  a  "governmental  decision"  by  the  Bank  of 
Greece,  according  to  a  basket  of  currencies.  The  weight  of  each  currency 
in  the  basket  is given  by  the  relative  importance  of  each  country  as  a 
commercial  partner  for  Greece.  Among  them  the  most  important  are  the 
dollar,  (due  to  the  fact  that  the dollar  is the  base  for  tourism,  payments 
of  the oil bills and  receipts  from  the  merchant  navy),  the  OM,  the  FF,  the 
Italian Lira  and  the  other  European  currencies.  Since  Greece's  adhesion, 
the  drachma  has  been  introduced  to  the  Paris  exchange  market  but  the quanti-
ties  handled  there  are  small  and  do  not  really  influence  the  exchange  rates 
set  up  by  the  Bank  of  Greece(3Q). 
As  in  most  economies,  inflation  in Greece  has  an  external  and  an 
internal  component.  The  external  component  is due  to the price  increases 
of  imports,  either due  to  an  absolute  increase  (as  happened  with  the oil 
prices  up  to  1979  and  other  raw  materials)  or  to an  increase  in the  equivalent - 19  -
in drachma,  due  to  a  devaluation of  the  exchange  rate of  the  drachma. 
The  internal  component  depends  on  such  factors  as  the  financing  of  the 
budget  deficit,  wage  developments,  the development  of  the  money  supply 
(related to  the  public deficit,  as  noted  above)  and  structural disequilibria. 
The  structural  element,  that  mirrors  the  disequilibria of  the  Greek  eco-
nomy,  like monopoly  elements,  an  important  intermediate  sector  from  pro-
duction  to  consumption,  a  possibly  important  "shadow"  economy,  speculative 
elements  etc.,  has  been  stressed often as  accounting  for  an  important  part 
of  the  inflation,  although  empirical  evidence  as  to the  relative  importance 
of  each  element  for  inflation  is  Lacking<31). 
Former  Greek  governments,  although  declaring  that  they  gave  great 
importance  to  the  aim  of  stability and  monetary  stability,  seemed  in  fact 
to neglect  this  aim.  In  reality the  aim  of  stability came  quite  low  in 
the  hierarchy of  economic  aims.  The  result  was  high  and  increasing  rates 
of  inflation.  The  failure  of  stabilisation was  due  both  to the  subordination 
of  this  aim  to others  and  also to the  Lack  of  a  coherent  Long  term  economic 
and  monetary  policy,  which  had  been  replaced  by  ad  hoc  measures  to  counter 
particularly urgent  problems.  These  ad  hoc  and  uncoordinated  measures 
aggravated  in  the  Long  term  the  instability of  the  Greek  economy. 
The  advantages  of  stability  <and  the  disadvantages  of  inflation)  are 
well  known:  amelioration of  trade  and  the  internal  transactions,  better pro-
gramming  at  every  level,  less  uncertainty  and  risk etc. 
In  the  next  sections  some  economic  policy options  that  could  be  raised 
against  the participation to  the  EMS,  are  examined  and  criticised.  The 
main  conclusion  is that  the  stabilisation of  the  Greek  economy,  upon  which 
the  new  Government  has  embarked,  is  necessary  and  that  the  adhesion  to  the 
EMS  can  be  an  element  ·in  a  stabilisation policy.  Further,  the  possible  cost 
of  the  adhesion  is examined  and  some  accompanying  policy  measures  are dis-
cussed. - 20  -
3.2  The  trade off  between  unemployment  and  inflation 
Adhesion  to  the  EMS,  with  its fixed  Cbut  adjustabl~ exchange  rate 
element,  the  central  rates,  means  aboundoning  flexible  exchange  rates 
<or  managed  floating  as  in  the  Greek  case).  This  would  entail  the  Loss 
of  independence  in  the  shaping  of  monetary  policy  and  a  constraint  in  eco-
nomic  policy  in  general.  This  would  have  negative  influences  on  the  fight 
against  unemployment  and  the  competitiveness  of  Greek  products  and  related 
to  this,  would  influence  adversely  the  balance  of  payments(32). 
The  argument  that  the  independence  of  monetary  and  economic  policy 
is  necessary  in order  to  reduce  unemployment,  is based  on  the  existence of 
a  trade-off  between  unei.~Loyment  and  monetary  expansion  or  the  inflation  rate. 
This  is  the  well  known  Phillips  relation.  If  a  country  follows  a  policy  that 
permits  it to  keep  a  certain exchange  rate parity, as  would  be  the  case  if 
Greece  joined  the  EMS,  then  this  country  would  no  Longer  be  able  to  reduce 
unemployment  through  an  expansionist  monetary  and  fiscal  policy.  This  argument 
is  correct  insofar  as  the  Phillips  relation  is valid. 
But  empirical  evidence  as  well  as  theoretic  considerations,  point  out 
that  the  Phillips  relation  is  no  Longer  valid.  It  was  based  on  a  certain 
degree  of  money  illusion and  considerable  Lags  in  the  adaptation of  expectations 
to  changes  in  money  supply.  Even  if one  does  not  accept  the  extreme  case  of 
rational  expectations,  it is  certain that  expectations  now  adapt  much  faster 
than  two  decages  ago,  when  the  Phillips  relation  seemed  to  be  valid.  In  the  Long 
term,  an  increase  in  inflation does  not  change  employment.  A short  term  unexpected 
increase  in  inflation  could  reduce,  but  not  permanently,  unemployment.  But  the 
social  cost  of  this  would  be  high,  since  the  economic  units  adapt  by  using  resources, 
among  them  also working  time,  so  that  these  resources  are  no  longer  available  for 
other  uses.  The  adaptation  results  in  a  waste  of  resources.  Further,  in order  to 
have  permanent  effects,  such  a  policy  would  lead  to  higher  and  higher  inflation, 
since  the  relevant  issue  is not  a  high  rate of  inflation,  but  an  increase  in  the 
rate of  inflation<33).  Also,  for  the  same  reasons  the  exchange  rate  cannot  be  used 
to  lower  real  wages,  in order  to  increase  competitiveness,  if real  wages  are  deemed 
to be  too  high.  The  existence of  high  inflation and  high  unemployment  at  the  same 
time  points  to  the  non  validity of  the  Phillips  curve.  At  the  same  time, 
countries  with  low  inflation also  had  Low  unemployment  as  for  example  Germany 
and  even  more  so  Switzerland.  In  the  1970s  there  seemed  to exist  a  perverted - 21  -
Phillips  curve,  combining  high  unemployment  with  high  inflation(34). 
Greece  seems  to  be  no  exception  to this,  since during  the  Last  years 
accelerating  inflation  was  accompanied  by  rising  unemployment. 
It  is also argued  that  under  flexible  exchange  rates  a  country  can 
choose  with  greater  freedom  its economic  policy,  it can  follow  an  ex-
pansionary  path  that  would  not  be  possible  under  fixed  exchange  rates, 
since  this  would  result  in a  devaluation. 
But,  also  under  flexible  exchange  rates, it is  by  no  means  certain 
that  expansionary  measures  can  have  the  desired effect  on  real  variables~ 
like output  and  employment.  Expanding  aggregate 9emand  spills over  into 
the  foreign  sector,  putting  immediate  downward  pressure  on  the  exchange 
rate.  Since  the  foreign  exchange  market  is  the  archetypical  "flex-price" 
market,  such  pressure will  immediately  be  converted  into a  depreciating 
exchange  rate,  raising  import  prices  and  hence  raising  money  wages  and 
inflation.  Under  flexible  exchange  rates,  the price  for  expanding  domestic 
income  and  employment,  if at all successful,  is  unacceptably  high  in  terms 
of  inflation.  A practical  example  of  the unfeasibility of  unilateral  ex-
pansion  was  France,  who  tried to  expand  unilaterally under  the  new  government 
in  1981.  This  resulted  in  higher  inflation and  devaluation of  the  FF, 
without  important  effects on  output  and  employment.  The  French  government 
recognised  the  failure of  this  policy  and  reversed  it(3S).  The  possibility 
of  unilateral  economic  policy  measures  are  even  Less  feasible  for  a  small 
open  economy  like Greece.  The  autonomy  of  economic  policy  is  constrained 
by  the  size and  the  openess  of  the  economy,  independently of  fixed  or 
flexible  exchange  rates. 
An  additional  criticism of  monetary  policy  measures,  which  try  to 
influence  real  demand  is that:  1)  The  time-lags  with  which  changes  in mone-
tary  instruments  have  an  impact  on  spending  decisions  are  both  long  and 
variable;  2)  The  monetary  authorities  cannot  use  their control  over  nomin•l 
quantities  to  peg  a  real  quantity  such  as  the  real  interest, the  rate of 
l  (36)  .  unemp  oyment,  real  income  or  the  real  exchange  rate  ;  3)  Accord1ng  to 
the  monetarists  it is advisable  to select  in each  country,  according  to its 
institutional  circumstances,  some  concept  of  the  money  supply,  as  the  prime 
target  and  to stick  to a  Low  and  steady  rate of  expansion of  this aggregate. - 22  -
In  particular,  the  disadvantagesof  monetary  measures  are  that  although 
their  short  run  effects  can  be  significant,  the  gradual  build-up over  a 
Long  period of  the effects of  monetary  policy  puts  the  monetary  authorities 
in  a  dilemma.  If  some  monetary  measure  is  designed  with  a  view  to  take ef-
fect  for  example  within  a  one-year  horizon,  it is unlikely that  the  additional 
effects will  fit  well  into  the desired  macroeconomic  pattern  for  the  following 
years.  They  may  have  to  be  at  Least  in part  neutralised  by  measures  in  the 
opposite direction.  Thus,  the  consequence  of  the  extended  time  pattern of 
the  responses  to  monetary  actions  is  to  impose  a  notable  instability upon 
the  monetary  actions  themselves.  Such  fluctuations  may  be  so  upsetting  to 
the  financial  markets  and  thereby  to  the  prospects  of  achieving  the  desired 
impact  on  real  demand  that  they  are  not  worth  having<3?). 
Under  flexible  exchange  rates  an  expansionary  monetary  policy will  Lead 
to a  devaluation.  This  again  will  Lead  through  rising  import  prices  and 
consequently  of  rising  nominal  wages,  to an  increase  in  inflation,  triggering 
thus  a  vicious  circle of  devaluation  and  inflation.  Many  European  countries, 
Greece  among  them,  suffered  from  this. 
In  the  Late  1960s,  flexible  exchange  rates  had  been  advocated  as  a  system 
that  would  contribute to national  economic  sovereignty  by  removing  the  ba-
lance  of  payments  constraints.  But  for  the  1970's  they  did  not  operate that 
way,  because,  while  they  allowed  for  vast  differences  in  inflation rates, 
the  external  constraint,  especially  for  weaker  countries,  appeared  actually 
to  increase.  The  floating  exchange  rates,  while  not  solving  the  balance  of 
payments  constraint,  transmitted fully  the  shock  of  external  disturbances 
<Like  the oil  shocks)  to domestic  inflation.  Given  the  already existing 
major  difficulties of  inflation control,  the  possibility of  a  fall  in  the 
exchange  rate  was  a  more  frightening  prospect  than  a  balance  of  payments 
deficit  under  fixed  exchange  rates,  since  such  deficits existed  in  any  case  also 
under  flexible  exchange  rates.  So,  the  idea  that  inflation  control  required 
at  least  the  avoidance  of  permanent  exchange  rate  fall~ gained  increasing ground. 
It  was  widely  believed  that  Germany  and  Switzerland,  but  also Austria  and  the 
Netherland; had  actually gained  from  an  appreciating exchange  rate  prompting 
a  "virtuous"  circle after the  first oil crisis.  This  idea  also made  weaker - 23  -
countries,  like  Italy and  Ireland,  join  the  EMS,  where  the  fixed  element 
predominates.  The  entry of  Italy,  Ireland and  also  France  in  the  EMS, 
entailing  to  a  certain degree  the  acceptance  of  the  lead of  Germany  in 
the  field of  monetary  policy,  was  seen  as  a  commitment  to  inflation control 
.  .  (38) 
1n  these  countr1es  • 
3.3.  The  balance  of  payments  and  competitiveness 
Another  argument  in  favour  of  flexible  exhange  rates  and  not  joining 
the  EMS  could  be  that  under  fixed  exchange  rates  the  balance  of  payments 
would  deteriorate and  that  competitiveness  would  suffer. 
The  exchange  rate  can  be  considered  in  two  parts,  a  "nominal"  and 
a  "real"(39'.  Concerns  about  the  exchange  rate  can  also be  divided  into 
a  real  and  a  nominal  part.  The  "popular''  economic  commentary  would  like 
policies  to deliver  high  competitiveness  (law  e),  so  as  to  "encourage  domestic 
industry  and  exports"  and  zero  inflation  <stable  P),  implying  a  rising no-
minal  exchange  rate  (S),  if there  is world  inflation  (if PF  rises).  At  the 
same  time  it is  feared  that  these  two  aims  are  incompatible.  It is often 
argued  that  monetary  policies  low  enough  to ensure  relatively stable prices 
will  necessarilycause  low  competitiveness.  The  mechanism  is assumed  to  run 
as  follows:  tight  money  works  by  raising  the  nominal  exchange  rater  some 
of  this  rise  shows  up  in  a  domestic  price  level  Lower  than  would  otherwise 
have  been,  but  some  shows  up  in  a  higher  real  exchange  rate because  money 
wages  will  not  fully  drop  due  to  the  change  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate. 
Those  who  are  concerned  about  the  competitiveness  of  the  domestic  industry 
advocate  a  Low  exchange  rate, even  if this  means  more  inflation.  It  seems 
that  previous  Greek  governments  accepted  this  view,  following  an  accommodating 
monetary  policy  and  a  continuous  devaluation  of  the exchange  rate to  influence 
the  domestic  industry,  to  stimulate exports  and  to  reduce  the  balance  of  pay-
ments  deficits.  This  view  is open  to serious  criticism. 
~· 
First~ it is  ex  ante  not  certain that  a  devaluation will  have  the de-
sired effect on  the  balance of  payments  and  this  independently  from  the  theory 
one  ascribes to,  since no  theory  maintains  that  the  result  will  be  under  any 
conditions  the  desired one<40' - 24  -
Secondly,  the  important  element  for  competitiveness  is  the  real  and 
not  the  nominal  exchange  rate,  but  the  real  exchange  rate  depends,  in  the 
long-run,  on  real  variables,  Like  the  differences  in  the  supply  characteristics 
of  aggregate  production  at  home  and  abroad,  which  result  in differential 
rates  of  productivity  growth  in  the  respective  traded  goods  sector. 
At  the  time  there  is wide  agreement  that  output  <and  so  also exports) 
is  not  greatly affected,  if at all, by  predicted  changes  in  the  supply  of 
money  or  the  exchange  rate.  This  is  not  to  say  that  unexpected  changes  also 
have  no  effect.  They  can  exert  important,  but  temporary  effects.  An  anti-
cipated  change  in  the  exchange  rate  has  no  real  effect,  whether  on  competi-
tiveness,  real  profits or employment,  if all prices  are  fully  flexible. 
An  unexpected  change  in  the  exchange  rate  can  produce  large  transitory wind-
fall  effects on  profits  and  competitiveness,  as  well  as  on  output  and  em-
ployment  in  the  traded  industries.  If  wage  rates  remain  Locked  in  units  of 
domestic  currency  and  firms  are  in full  competitive  equilibrium,  the  rise 
in profits and  employment  in  tradable  industries  that  will  follow  a  deva-
luation  is permanent.  The  important  element  in  the  outcome  of  a  devaluation 
is the  response  of  money  wages.  Again,  the  characteristics and  the  existence 
or  not  of  a  "normal"  Phillips  curve  are decisive.  If expectations  of  inflation 
are  formed  rationally,  new  information  is  transmitted  instantaneously  and 
wage  contracts  are  continually  renegotiated  (this  means  that  the  Phillips  curve 
is vertical,  non  "normal"),then  the  effect  of  a  devaluation  is  insignificant. 
If expectations  of  inflation are  altered slowly,  this will  not  be  so,  and 
devaluation will  have  an  effect(41 ). 
Third,  the existing empirical  eviden~e supports  the  view  that  devaluation 
does  not  usually  have  the desired effect  on  the  balance of  payments.  Current 
account  positions  seemed  to  react  disappointingly  slowly,  if at all, to ex-
change  rate  changes,  even  when  these  were  large  and  went  consistently  in one 
direction.  The  most  notable  examples  were  those  of  Germany,  Switzerland 
and  Japan.  But  among  the deficit  countries  too,  it was  felt  that  both  the 
UK  and  Italy were  hardly  helped  by  the  steep depreciation of  the  pound  and 
the  lira, while  the  UK  had  later surpluses  combined  with  appreciations  (which 
were  due  primari.ly  to the  North  Seal oill(42>.  This  can  be  explained  in 
~ '··  ... ,  •.. part  by  the  fact  that  the price,  which  is effected by  the  exchange 
rate  is  only  one  element  of  the  competitiveness of  one  product,  the 
qualitative,  non  price  elements  Like  quality,  punctual  delivery and 
after sales  services  being  very  important  elements,  in  particular  for 
high  technology  products. 
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The  Greek  experience  also  seems  to  support  this view,  because  the 
steady  devaluation of  the drachma  over  a  long  period of  time  did  not  ame-
liorate the  balance  of  payment  situation.  As  can  be  seen  from  tables  8 
and  9,  while  the  drachma  depreciated steadily towards  the  ECU  <which  can 
be  taken  as  an  average  of  the  bilateral exchange  rates  with  the  nine 
currencies  participating  in it), there  is no  clear  tendency  in  the develop-
ment  of  the deficit  of  the  current  account  of  balance of  payments. 
Fourth,  the  above  mentioned  view  does  not  take  into account  the  in-
fluence  of  inflation and  the  connected  devaluation expectation on  the  capital 
movements. 
At  present,  the  free  movement  of  capital  does  not  apply  to  Greece  and 
even  after its application this  freedom  is  not  absolute.  Still, although 
Greece  has  relatively severe  capital  controls~ there  has  been  a  constant 
and  often  illegal outflow of  capital  for  speculative  reasons,  which  was 
accentuated whenever  a  sharp devaluation of  the drachma  was  expected.  This 
outflow  could  possibly  increase after the transition period if the  inflation 
differences  remain  high,  and  the  interest  rates  very  low  and  even  negativeias 
they  are~.  If the  monetary  authorities  continue their policy of  maintaining 
fixed  interest  rates on  deposits at  low  levels  along  with  an  underdeveloped 
domestic  capital  market  and  the  presence of  inflationary pressures,  this will 
result  in  an  increase  in  the  already  high  demand  for  real  estate together  with 
an  increased capital outflow.  In  both  cases  the  result  is unfavourable  for 
d  .  .  (43)  omest1c  1nvestment  • 
Capital  flows  depend  on  changes  in the  uncovered  interest  rate dif-
ferential  and  changes  in the expected  rate of exchange  rate  change, 
e.g.  appreciation  o~in the  case  of  the  drachma,more  likely devaluation. 
In  Greece  the  high  inflationary expectations  coupled  with  the  low  interest 
rates  resulted  in an  increased  capital  outflow,  as  mentioned  above. - 26  -
This  ~~ould mean,  that,  as  was  the  case  with  the  other  European  countries, 
large  capital  flows  acted  as  a  buffer~ offsetting  in  part  the  impact  of 
internal  monetary  actions.  Accelerations  of  domestic  relative to  foreign 
money  creation  tended  to  cause  outflows  matching  a  growing  share of  the 
initial expansionary action.  Investors  continuously  reshuffle  their port-
folios  by  shifting out  of  assets  denominated  in  currencies  that  are  weak 
and  into assets  that  are  strong  in  terms  of  expected purchasing  power. 
This  results  in  a  transmission  of  nominal  to real  variables:  Inflation dif-
ferences  coupled  with  expectations  and  interest  rates differences  result 
in  capital  outflow  from  the  weaker  currencies,  which  influences  negatively 
the  capital  account  and  so also  the  short  run  exchange  rate,  which  is  in-
fluenced  primarily  by  the  capital  account  situation.  At  the  same  time, 
domestic  investment  is  reduced,  resulting  in  negative effects on  growth. 
ld  k  .  f  .  .  .  l  (44)  One  cou  spea  aga1n  o  a  v1c1ous  c1rc  e  • 
The  adhesion  of  the  drachma  to  the  EMS  would  have  favourable  effects 
on  expectations,  inflation and  in  strengthening  the  exchange  rate of  the 
drachma.  This  in  turn  would  influence  positively  the  capital  outflow  from 
Greece  and  so  result  in  a  further  stabilisation of  the  exchange  rate,  re-
ducing  the  external  pressure  on  inflation.  This  again  would  reduce  the  need 
of  intervention by  the  central  bank  in  order  to defend  a  certain exchange 
.  (45)  rate marg1n 
But  the  adhesion  to  the  EMS  would  influence  positively the  inflow of 
capital  to  Greece  due  to the  existence of  Council  Regulation  No  1736/49, 
that  provides  that  ''Loans  granted  from  its own  resources  by  the  European 
Investment  Bank •••  and  loans  granted  under  Decision  78/870/EEC  to aid  invest-
ments  in  the  less  prosperous  Member  States  may  carry  an  interest  subsidy 
(of  3%  per  year)  financed  by  the  budget  of  the  European  Communities,  provided 
that  these  States effectively and  fully  participate  in  the  mechanisms  of  the 
(46)  European  Monetary  System"  • 
Considering  that  investment  and  capital  inflow  depend  on  profit  and 
that  profit  is a  function  of  the  interest  rate,  a  decrease  in the  interest 
rate  <through  the  subsidy)  would  increase  capital  inflow  and  investment. 
Italy and  Ireland did exploit  fully  the possibilities given  by  this  regulation. - 27  -
3.4  Inflation  tax  and  "tax-push"  inflation. 
Another  explanation  advanced  to explain  some  governments•  "preference" 
for  inflation  is  that  inflation profits  them  due  to  the  "inflation tax"  and 
secondly  because  it eases  the  bargaining process. 
The  "inflation tax"  is due  to the  fact  that  due  to  inflation nominal 
incomes  "jump"  to  higher  income  brackets  where  the  tax  coefficient  is  higher, 
so  that  the  government's  revenue  is  increasing  without  any  new  tax  imposition. 
Also,  inflation  favours  net  borrowers  and  the  state  is usually  a  net  borrower(4?). 
The  view  that  the  state did  really  profit  from  inflation was  accepted 
till recently,  when  new  empirical  work,  e.g.  in  the  USA  and  Germany  questioned 
this.  According  to  these  studies,  inflation has  resulted  in  higher  total 
government  expenses  than  revenues,  so  that  the  net  public  debt  increased  with 
inflation<4B). 
But  even  if the  state profited  from  the  existence of  the  "inflation tax" 
this  would  be  due  to  an  abuse  of  the  state's monetary  monopoly.  In  a  democracy 
this  should  not  be  done  and  a  greater  transparency  of  the state's  revenue 
is desirable.  If a  deceleration of  inflation  reduces  the state's revenue, 
(without  at  the  same  time  reducing  even  more  the state's expenses,  as  recent 
empirical  studies  point  out)  then  the  hidden  "inflation tax"  should  be  replaced 
by  an  open  increase of  taxation,  that  should  be  visible to  the  tax  payer. 
The  idea  that  has  gained  ground  during  the  last  decade  is that,  since 
no  money  illusion  is  valid any  more,  money  wages  are  determined  in a  bargaining 
context  which  stresses after-tax  real  wages.  This  implies,  contrary  to  con-
ventional  wisdom,  that  tax  increases  are  inflationary while  tax  cuts  may  have 
the  opposite effect.  Thus  governments  concerned  about  the  Level  of  wage  set-
tlements  could offer tax  cuts  in exchange  for  moderation  in wage  demands, 
ensuring  so  that  real  wage  aspirations are satisfied at  a  lower  level  of  wage 
settlements  than  would  otherwise  have  occured. 
Under  rapid  inflation progressive  taxes  had  the  following  repercussions: 
In  countries  relying on  progressive  systems  of  taxation  the  rapid  increase 
in  nominal  wages  under  the  impetus  of  sharply  r1s1ng  consumer  prices  led  to 
La  d  .  .  t  L.  b. l.  .  l  l  f  l  ·  <49>  unp  nne  1ncreases  1n  ax  1a  1  1ty at  g1ven  eve  s  o  rea  1ncome  • - 28  -
The  unplanned  rise  in existing  high  rates of  direct  taxation  intensified 
industrial  and  political  conflict,  undermined  fiscal  control  and  made 
budgetary  policy  more  erratic  and  less  predictable.  The  unforeseen  rise 
in direct  tax  Liability  intensified cost  pressures~ making  it more  dif-
ficult  to  bring  down  the  rate of  inflation  (due  to  a  wage-cost  push  type 
of  inflation).  Additionally,  the  effect  of  progressive  tax  scales  in  re-
ducing  differentials  b~tween skilled and  unskilled and  blue  and  white-collar 
workers  and  also  between  recipients  of  untaxed  unemployment  and  welfare  be-
nefits  became  decissive  issues  in  industrial  relations  and  national  politics. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  existence of direct  tax-push  inflation is controversial 
and  is a  notoriously difficult area  where  empirical  evidence  is still un-
.  (50)  sat1sfactory  • 
3.5  Related  policy  measures 
In  the  preceding  paragraphs  some  aspects  of  the  flexible  exchange  rates 
and  the  relation to  inflation were  examined  and  criticised. 
In  concluding,  relative exchange  rate  stability offers  the  following 
advantages  to  a  small  open  economy  like  that  of  Greece: 
1.  The  smaller  economy  tends  to  produce  a  less  diversified  range  of  output 
with  a  relatively  large  concentration of  traded  goods.  External  shocks 
have  a  larger  impact  on  the  small,  undiversified economy  than  on  a  bigger 
country  with  an  important  internal  market.  Relative  exchange  rate stabi-
lity facilitates trade  by  reducing  the  risk  due  to  the  fluctuation  of  ex-
change  rates. 
2.  A small  economy  with  its modest  currency  faces  a  higher  probability that 
collusive  behaviour  among  speculators  will alter the  value of  the  ex-
change  rate.  The  financial  intervention mechanisms  of  the  EMS  offer some 
degree  of  guarantee  against  such  pressures. 
3.  To  the  extent  that  changes  in  world  prices or  in the  exchange  rate affect 
a  large  proportion of  items  in  the  domestic  price  index,  price movements 
inside  the  country  are  heavily  influenced  by  external  disturbances.  The 
percentage of  ''imported''  inflation under  flexible  exchange  rates  is  higher 
the  smaller  the  economy. - 29  -
4.  The  low  degree  of  diversification ~f the  country's  output  tends  to 
reduce  the  price elasticities of  exports  and  imports,  so  that  the 
changes  in domestic  activity necessary  to correct external  inbalances 
are  necessarily  large. 
5.  The  small  open  economy  is a  price  taker  in  the  international  market. 
This  implies  that  expenditure-switching policies  <i.e.  altering  the 
relative price of  traded  to  non-traded goods)  are  not  an  effective 
means  of  correcting balance  of  trade deficits, which  require  instead 
changes  in  domestic  absorption.  It also  implies  that  any  attempt  on 
the  part  of  the  monetary  authorities to  raise  the  domestic  money  supply 
above  the  amount  which  individuals  and  firms  demand  leads  to a  balance 
of  payments  deficit  and  a  Loss  of  reserves. 
6.  Joining  the  EMS,  in  relation to a  stabilisation policy  means  a  stabi-
Lisation  of  the drachma's  exchange  rate.  This  would  have  favourable 
effects on  Greece's  terms  of  trade(51). 
Throughout  this paper  Greece's  adhesion  to  the  EMS  was  seen  as  an 
element  in  a  general  stabilisation policy and  in  the  fight  against  in-
flation.  Adhesion  to  the  EMS  would  not  be  possible  without  a  reduction 
of  inflation  in Greece.  An  anti-inflationary policy might  have  some  cost 
in  terms  of  unemployment  <although  this  is  not  at all certain, since  it 
rests  on  the assumption  of  the  existence of  the Phillips  curve)  but  even 
so,  this  cost  is only  transitory and  must  be  compared  to  the  permanent  (and 
increasing)  cost  of  high  inflation. 
Greece's  adhesion  to the  EMS  also  raises  some  specific questions: 
1)  The  problem  of  a  depletion of  reserves  of  foreign  exchange.  One  cause 
of  reluctance to  join  the  EMS  could  be  that  Greece's  reserves  of  foreign 
exchange  would  be  depleted  rapidly  in  interventions of  the  Bank  of  Greece 
in  an  endeavour  to  keep  the  exchange  rate of  the drachma  within  the  margins 
of  the  EMS.  This  is certainly  reasonable  in the present  situation with 
Greece's  inflation  lying much  above  the  European  average.  But  this  fear 
i~ no  longer  valid  in  the  context  of  a  stabilisation policy,  when  the 
inflation rate  would  be  much  reduced.  In this context  the  reduction of 
inflation ana  stable exchange  rates  within  the  EMS  would  be  parallel 
cnu  mutually  supporting  aims.  Further,  the  financial  support  mechanisms 
of  tne  E~S are  sufficient  to meet  such  eventualities.  Also,  the  drachma - 30  -
could  benefit  from  a  larger  margin  of  fluctuation  within  the  EMS,  like  the 
Italian  Lira,  which  would  require  less  intervention  Cor  Less  frequently). 
Lastly,  the  central  parities of  the  EMS  can  be  realigned  if necessary. 
2)  Adhesion  to the  EMS  would  require  the  Liberalisation of  capital  move-
ments  to  some  degree,  and  the existence of  a  real  foreign exchange 
market  for  the  drachma,  where  the daily bilateral  exchange  rates  could 
be  set.  This  liberalisation of  capital  movements  is  foreseen after  the 
transition period of  five  years,  i.e.  in  1985.  The  drachma  could  join 
the  EMS  at  about  this  time,  or  later, on  condition that  a  stabilisation po-
licy  will  have  succeeded  in  reducing  inflation to an  acceptable  level. 
The  Greek  government  could  accordingly  choose  the  appropriate  time  and 
fluctuation  margin  for  Greece's  adhesion  to the  EMS. 
The  success  of  the stabilisation policy depends  primarily  on  wage  behaviour. 
(52)  Some  form  of  incomes  policy  can  then  be  chosen  as  an  accompanying  measure 
The  following  options  are  possible: 
(1)  The  setting of  monetary  targets.  In  countries  that  have  introduced  such targets 
like Germany,  the  targets are  thCl.lght  to have  had  an  irrportant  iiJl)act  on  price expectations, 
because  if trade  unions~ and  employers  recognize  that  the  growth  of  no-
mi~al  demand  will  be  effectively dampened  by  the  target,  so  that  a  rate 
of  wage  increases  in  excess  of  that  target  wi.ll  lead  to  slower  growth 
of  output  and  employment  and  these  consequences  are  regarded  as  unde-
sirable.  The  conditions  are  met  for  a  direct  impact  from  the  monetary 
target  on  prices  and  wages.  The  announcement  of  targets  then  becomes  akin 
to a  declaration of  a  non-mandatory  indirect  incomes  policy.  The  evaluation 
f  h  G 
.  .  .  .  (53)  o  t  e  erman  exper1ence  1s  pos1t1ve  • 
<2>  Direct  incomes  policy.  Here  also  there are  various possibilities,  ranging 
from:  1.  the  German  'concerted action'  model,  where  incomes  policy  serves 
as  a  common  framework  of  assumptions  and  data  on  the  economic  situat.ion on 
which  the bargaining process  is based;  2.  the  Norwegian  "quid pro  quo" 
model  where  wage  and  income  moderation  is  implemented  with  the state granting 
tax  reductions;  3.  the  "coersive" model  where  the government  unilaterally 
prohibits  wage  and  income  increases  above  a  limit  set  by  it for  certain 
.  d  t  4  b.  t .  f  1  3  .  h  .  l  (54)  per1o  s;  o  •  com  1na  1ons  o  cases  - w1t  pr1ce  centro  s  • - 31  -
Although  the  experience  with  incomes  policy  is different  from  country 
to  country  it seems  that  especially  in  s~aller countries  incomes  policy  has 
exerted  a  moderating  influence  on  cost  developments  and  so  on  inflation. 
Smaller  countries  are often better placed  to try  to  reach  a  consensus  on 
economic  policy  through  discussion  and  negotiation  simply  because  of  their 
size  that  implies  Less  diversity, easier  communication  and  fewer  decision 
makers,  and  sometimes,,  the  traditions of  social  and  political  cohesion. 
Also,  under  partially  rational  expectations  incomes  policy  has  a  potentially 
powerful  role  to  play  in  disciplining expectations  and  wage  aspirations. 
Furthermore;  they  can  be  viewed  as  instruments  to  reduce  uncertainty,  because 
in  indeterminate situations,  as  those  wnicn  arise out  of  the oligopolistic 
character of  bilateral bargaining,  there  always  exists the  possibility of an 
irregular,  unforseeable  element  of  decision making.  In  the  absence  of  in-
comes  policies  such  disturbances  could  create  inflationary  shocks  that  mone-
tary  and  fiscal  policy  could  find difficult to  cope  with.  The  response  to 
the  uncertainty arising out  of  the  indeterminacy  is  centralisation ana  a 
government  incomes  policy  is  such  a  method  of  cPntralisation. 
One  explanation  for  trade  unions  accepting  incomes  policies  is  that 
such  policies  appear  to be  a  less  costly  way  to  reach  agreements  which  yield 
almost  i~entical  results  as  those of  more  aggressive  forms  of strategy(liKe 
strikes).  If  the  final  outcome  is  likely to be  the  same  as  in the  absence 
of  a  policy,  acceptance  would  increase predictability  in  collective bargaining, 
reduce  the  risk  and  the  loss  of  open  conflict,  and  thus  make  the  same  economic 
conflict  possible at  lower  cost  for  the  union  and  its members<SS>. 
The  establishment  of  an  incomes  policy as  a  place  for  centralisation 
of  the  bargaining  process  on  the  Lines  of 'the  German  or  the  Norwegian  model 
seems  to offer  important  advantages  also  for  Greece,  in  relation to a  general 
stabilisation policy. 
A stabilisation policy  is necessary  in Greece·due  to the  very  high  inflation 
still existing.  The  Greek  government  has  already  embarked  on  such  a  policy, 
setting the  target  of  20%  inflation for  1983  (e.g.  a  reduction of  3-4%  com-
pared  to  1982).  Such  a  stabilisation policy necessitates  the  use  of all eco• 
nomic  instruments  available.  In  the  framework  of  such  a  policy-mi~the adhesion 
of  the  drachma  to the  EMS  at  the  appropriate  moment  would  be  an  additional  po-
sitive element  in  safeguarding  the external  side of  the economy. - .32  -
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The  determinants  of  the  real  exchange  rate are  real  things,  notably  the 
social  security  taxation  regime".  P.  Minford,  op.  cit. p.  122. 
Ut2)  See  J.  Llewellyn  and  S.  Potter  "Competitiveness  and  the  Current  Account" 
in  A.  Boltho  and  M.  Albert,  op.  cit. 
(43)  See  Demopoulos,  op.  cit. 
(44)  See  P.  Korteweg,  op.  cit., N.  Thygessen  op.  cit.  M.  Beenstock  et. al., 
op.  cit.  and  A.  Lamfalussy,  "The  Failure of  Global  Fixity?"  in 
R.  Triffin,  op.  cit. 
C45)  I  am  of  course  not  arguing  that  the  adhesion  to  the  EMS  without  the 
necessary  accompanying  measures  would  be  sufficient  in  itself to  reduce 
inflation.  The  EMS  and  relative exchange  rate stability is only  one 
element  in a  stabilisation, although  an  important  one. 
(46)  See  O.J.  No  L 200  of  8.8.1979. 
(47)  See  D.  Laidler  "Difficulties with  European  Monetary  Union"  in 
M.  Fratianni  and  Th.  Peeters. 
(48>  ~~e P.  Kohnert,  N.  Kyriazis  "Inflation and  the State's Expenditure" 
in  "OIKONOMIKOS",  31  August  1978.  where  the  results of  an  empirical 
study  for  Germany  are  presented  <in  Greek). - 38  -
(49)  Even  countries  which  had  already  implemented  some  form  of  indexation 
of  tax  brackets  and  allowances  <as  Greece  did  also  recently),  did  not 
escape  this effect  because  adjustments  for  the  effect  of  inflation were 
made  with  a  time  Lag  of  about  fifteen  to twelve  months. 
<50)  The  Level  of direct  taxes  figured  prominently  in  the political discussions 
in  the  Netherlands  and  Denmark.  SeeM.  J.  Artis  "Incomes  Policies: 
Some  Rationales",  J.  T.  Addison  "Incomes  Policy:  The  Recent  European 
Experience"  and  R.  F.  Elliott  and  J.  L.  Fallick  "Incomes  Policies, 
Inflation and  Relative  Pay:  An  Overview",  all  in J.  L.  Fallick  and 
R.  F.  Elliott  "Incomes  Policies,  Inflation and  Relative  Pay",  George  Allen 
and  Unwin,  London  1981. 
(51)  See  H.  Christie  and  M.  Fratianni  "EMU:  Rehabilitation of  a  Case  and 
Some  Thoughts  for  Strategy"  in  M.  Fratianni  and  Th.  Peeters  and 
G.  vangrevelinghe  "Le  Systeme  Monetaire  Europeen",  Groupe  de  reflexions 
economiques  et  financieres,  Colloque  14  juin 1979. 
<52)  The  Greek  government  has  recently  introduced  a  form  of  incomes  policy. 
See  the  second  part  of  the  present  study. 
(53)  It must  be  remarked  that  the  formulation  and  announcement  of  the  monetary 
target  by  the  Bundesbank  was  part  of  an  integrated and  comprehensive 
"concerted action"  that  involved  the  Bundesbank,  the  federal  government 
and  employers  and  trade  unions  representatives.  There  was  no  question 
of  surprising  the  public  with  next  year•s  monetary  target.  The  investi-
gation  of  the  German  success  must  therefore  focus  attention on  the  factors 
which  made  this  approach  to stabilisation policy  feasible  and  not  alone 
in  the  monetary  component.  See  N.  Thygessen  "Monetary  Policy",  op.  cit. 
<54)  For  the  implementation  and  the  experience  with  various  forms_of  incomes 
policy  in  Europe  see J.  T.  Addison  "Incomes  Policy:  The  Recent  European 
Experience"  in  Fallick  and  Elliott. 
<55)  See  Karl-Olof  Faxen  "Incomes  Policy  and  Centralised  Wage  Formation" 
in  A.  Boltho. T~~l~ 1 
Prift dc.•nacor of CUP •• m•k~t P"ires 
(IIOiiftwal ntr~y.  IIIWifll ,_C'f'llltJt:~ dttlnrt') 
8  UK  D  CR  ,  IRL  L  NL  lJK  t:c 
~~~~R  I.S  1,8  3,4,  1-.6  11,8'  S,8  2,.5  1,8  4,0  4,8 
I  ~~"i9  n.M  3,6  0,8  0.2  S,1  2.7- -0;7  -1,8  1,2  1,1  1,7 
l'.kl()  0,7  I,N  3,4  J,S  3,5  0,3  0,0  4,1  3,4  l,S  2.7 
l%1  JJ  4.3  4,2  I,S  3,4  2,S  2.8  0,4  2,6  3,4  3,3 
)Ut.~  1,7  6.6  3,9  4,6  4,7  4,9  5,8  -1,0  3.2  3,7  4,4 
IQ~J  3.0  5,8  2,7  1,4  6,4  2,7  8,S  5,0  s.o  2,3  4,5 
llltt4  4.7  4,6  3,2  3.7  4,1  9,7  '6.5  5,4  8,4  3,6  4,6 
J')h~  5.1  7,4  3,4  4,0  2.7  4~.¢  4,2  3,4  6,1  s.o  4,4 
I'Jft(,  4.2  3,6  3.7  4,8  2,9  4,4  2,2  :\,0  6,0  4,5  3.6 
1')(17  :u  6,0  1.3  2.5  3,2  3,3  2.8  1,0  4.2  2,9  2.6 
l')h~  2.7  7,'1.  1,9  1,7  4,2  4,2  1,7  5.1  4.2  4,0  J.2 
19()9  4,M  6,8  3,6  3,4  6,6  9-,1  4,1  s.s  6,4  s.s  5.3 
19-70 
.J  4,8  8.1  7,3  3,9  5,6  9,7  6,9  11,2  5,6  7,3  6,8 
1961-70  3,5  6,0  3,5  3,1  4,4  s,s  4,5  3,9  5,2  4,2  4,3 
1971  5.4  7.9  7,6  3,8  5,8  10,5  7,2  -0,8  8,5  9,3  7,5 
197:!  6.2  9.0  5.5  4.5  6.2  13.4  6,3  4,9  9.4  8,3  6.8 
19i3  7.0  10,5  6,0  19,4  7,8  15,3  11,6  10,6  8,4  7,1  8.2 
1~74  12.2  1·2.8  6,7  21.0  11,1  6,1  18,5  17,7  9,3  15,0  12,5 
1975  12.6  12.8  6,4  12.3  t3,4  22,3  17,5  -1,0  11,2  26,9  15,0 
\  197b  7.5  8,7  3,4  15,4  10,1  20,2  18,0  ....t2,9  8,9  14.7  10,5 
1977  7.1  8,8  3,8  13,0  8,9  12,3  19.1  0,9  6,3  14,0  9,8 
19i8  4,1  10,3  3,7  12,9  9,8  10,6  13,9  5,8  5~2  10,9  8,3 
J•)7Q  4,2  7.7  3,8  .  18,7  10,6  12,4  15,7  6,9  4,2  IS,I  9,3 
19~()  4,3  8,4  4,7  18,4  11,5  14,1  20.4  6,8  5,3  18,9'  10,8 
1971-80  7,0  9,7  5,2  13,8  9,S  13,6  14,7  6,3  7,6  13,9  9,8 
1981  5,4  9,5  4,2  19,7  IJ,7  17,8  17,6  s,o  5,5  12,1  10,6 
(198:!)  7,3  10,6  4,8  21,7  12,4  19,2  17,,  8,7  ~  8,4  10.6 
Ty0l~ 2 
Price deO:uor or priv•te consumption 
(ttOiiGflfll tWmte'JI. I/IWfiiiJI ~  cltenrf~) 
8  OK  D  GR  F  IRL  L  NL  lJK  EC 
III~S  0,1  0,5  2,5  0,0  12.1  3,8  2,3  1.6  2,7  4,3 
I•J:'')  -OJ  2.5  1,0  -o.s  5,8  0,4  -0,7  1.2  1,0  1,8 
I11Nl  :?.4  2,9  1,0  3,1  3,6  0,9  1,4  2,5  1.1  '  1,7 
1961  2.7  3,6  3,6  1,1  3,4  2,4  1,8  0,5  2.1  3.0  2,9 
1'.1(12  1.0  6,2  3,0  -1.2  4,4  3,6  S,3  0,9  2,7  3,9  4,0 
1963  3.7  5,7  2,8  5,8  5,8  2,2  7,1  2,9  3,9  1,9  4,1 
I~N  4.1  4·.0  2,6  2,2  3,4  7,3  5,0  3,1  6,9  3,6  3,9 
19(.5  4,6  6.1  3.3  4,6  2.6  5.0  3,6  3.2  4,1  4.9  4,1 
l'Jttb  4.1  0,2  3,7  3.5  3,2  2,8  2,9  3.5  5,5  4,0  3.S 
1967  2.5  6,7  1,7  1.9  3,1  3,1  3,1  2.3  3,1  2,6  2.5 
t9fi~  2.9  7,7  1,8  0,8  5,1  4.4  1,4  2,5  2.7  4,5  3,3 
1969  :!.9  4,7  2.3  3,0  7,1  7,2  -·  2.9  1.8  6,2  5,6  4,7 
1970  J,6  7.1  4,1  3,2  s.o  8.2  s.o  4.0  4,3  6,0  5.1 
1'>61-70  J.2  5,2  2.9  2,5  .4.3  4,6  3,8  2,5,  4,1  4,0  3,H 
J'J7t  5.~  7,8  6,0  2,9  S,$· ·-·  '9,4  s.s  4,7  8,5  8,6  6,6 
1972  5,5  8,2  5.6  3,5  5,9  9,6  6,4  5,2  8,9  6,6  6,3 
1973  6,0  11.6  7,7  15,0  6,8  11,6  •,  12,4  5,0  9,1  8,6  8,8 
1974  12,4  14,8  6,9  23,6  13,2  15,7  20,8  9,9  10,0  17,4  14,1 
1975  12,5  9,9  5,9  13,0  11,4  22,3.  17,6  10,2  10,7  23,S  13,7 
1976  7,9  9.4  4,4  14,0  9,9  18,8  18,1  9,5  8,8  15,S  10,8 
1977  6,8  9,9  3,9  11,6  9,2  12,5  18,2  5,8  5,9  15,1  9,9 
1978  3,9  9,8  2,4  12,6  8,8  7;5  12,9  3.5  4,3  8,9  7,1 
1979  3,9  9.6  4,0  17,7  10,9  13,4  15,0  5,8  4,3  14,3  9,1 
1980  6,5  11,5  5,3  23,7  13,2  18,3  20,4  7,7  6.6  lS,S  11,1 
1971·80  7,0  10.2  5,2.  13,6  9,5  13,8  14,6  6,7  7,7  13,3  9,7 
19M I  9,1  10,7  6,0  24,4  12,S  19,6  19,0  8,1  6,5  10,9  11,8 
(1982)  9,0  9,9  s.o  23,0  11,0  18,S  16,6  11,0  6,3  8,8  lO,S 
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Table  3 
Short·ltnn intenst rates  (•;.; 
au.u  OK  D  GR  ,  IRL  NL  UK  EC 
J')~R  3,6  10,0  6,5  3,9  3,0 
195~  3,2  8,8  4,1  3,6  1,9 
1%0  5.1  8,0  4,1  3,6  2,1 
1961  4,6  6,3  3,6  8,0  3,7  6,2  3,6  1,1  6,2  4,2 
1%2  3.4  6,5  3,4  8,0  3,6  5,0  3,6  1.9  5,0  ),9 
1~63  3,6  6,1  4,0  7,9  4,0  4,3  3,6  2,0  4,3  4,0 
1964  4,9  6.2  4,1  7,8  4,7  s.s  3,6  3,5  s.s  4,6 
1965  s.o  6,5  S.l  7,8  4,2  6,8  3,6  4,0  6,8  s.o 
19M  5.6  6,5  6,6  8,0  4,8  7,0  3,6  4,9  7,0  5.7 
1%7  s.s  6,6  4.3  8,5  4,8  6,3  3,6  4,7  6,3  4,9 
19M  4,5  6:6  3,8  8,3  6,2  7,9  3,6  4,6  7,9  5,3 
1969  7,3  8,2  5,8  8,0  9,3  9,2  3,8  5,1  9,2  7,1 
1970  8,1  9,0  9,4  8,0  8,6  7,0  5,3  6,2  8,1  8,0 
1961-70  5,2  6,8  s.o  8,0  5,3  6,5  3,8  3,8  6,6  5,3 
1971  5,4  7,6  7,2  8,0  6.0  6,6  5,7  4,5  6,2  6,3 
IIJ72  4,2  7,3  5,6  8,0  5,3  7,0  5,2  2,7  6,8  .  5,6 
1973  6,6  7,6  12,1  9,0  9,3  12,2  7,0  7,5  11.8  9,9 
1974  10,6  10,0  9,9  11,8  13,0  14,5  14,9  10,4  13,4  12.2 
t97S  7,0  8,0  S,O  11,9  7,6  10,9  10.4  5,3  10,6  7.9 
1976  10,1  8,9  4,3  11,5  •,  8,7  11,6  16,0  7,4  11,6  9,4 
1917  7,3  14,5  4,4  12,0  9,1  8,4  14,0  4,8  8,0  8,3 
19iS  7.3  15,4  3,7  13,5  7,8  9,8  lJ ,5  7.0  9.4  7.8 
JQi~  10,9  12,5  6,7  16,7  9,7  16,0  12,0  9,6  13,9  10,4 
19tl0  14,2  16,9  9,5  21,0  12,0  16,3  16,9  10,6  16,8  13.4 
1970-80  8,3  10,8  6,8  12,3  8,8  11,3  I I ,3  6,9  10,8  9,1 
1981  15,6  14,9  12,4  16,8  IS,J.  16,7  19,0  11.8  14,1  14,7 
. ;;-:r  ..... :  •  ~  .;  •I  -
Table  4 
l..ong-trrm int(rtSI ratn 
~~) 
BLEU  OK  D  OR  F  IRL  NL  UK  EC 
19.58  6,5  7,6  5,0  6,7  4,3  s.o 
1'1~9  5,8  6,3  4,8  5.7  4,1  4,8 
J9b0  6,3  5,7  5,4  5,3  4,2  5,4 
1961  5,9  6,6  5,9  5,5  6,2  5,2  3,9  6,3  S,S 
196.2  5,2  6,6  5,9  5,4  6.0  5,8  4,2  5,9  5,5 
19h3  5,0  6,5  6,1  5,3  5.6  6,1  4,2  5,4  5,5 
19(-4  5,6  7,1  6,2  5,5  6,0  7,4  4,9  6,0  6,0 
I'J~S  6,4  8,6  7.1:  6.2  6,2  6,4  6,9  S,2  6,6  6,S 
t 
~~~(')  6,7  8,7  H,l  7,4  6.6  6,R  6,5  6,2  6,9  6,9 
l•lh7  6,7  9,1  7,0  7,4  6,7  6.7  6,5  6,0  6,8  6,6 
I'~C'S  6,6  R,7  6.5  7,3  7,0  6,5  6,6  6.2  7,6  6,7 
l')to~  7,3  9,7  6,8  7,1  7,9  7,3  6,7  7,0  9,1  7,5 
1970  7,8  11,1  8,3  7,4  8,6  7,8  9,0  7,8  9,3  8,5 
1961-70  6,3  8,3  6,8  7,1  6,5  6,5  6,7  5,6  7,0  6,5 
JQ71  7,3  11,0  8,0  1,5  8,4  9,2  8,3  7,0  8,9  8,2 
1972  7.0  11.0  7,9  7,8  8,0  9.1  1,5  6,7  9,0  7,9 
1973  7.5  12.6  9.3  10,4  9,0  10,7  7,4  7,3  10,8  9,1 
1974  8.8  15,9  10,4  9,6  11,0  14.6  9.9  10,7  15,0  11,5 
1975  8,5  12,7  8.5  9,0  10,3  14.0  11,5  9,1  14,5  10,8 
197(\  9,1  14,9  7.8  10,0  10,5  14,6  13,1  9,2  14,6  11.0 
1~7i  8.8  16,2  6,2  9,2  11,0  12.9  14,6  8,5  12.5  10,4 
l'l7~  R,S  16,8  5,7  9,3  10,6  12,8  13,7  8,1  12,6  10,1 
I9N  9.7  16.7  7,4  13,3  10,9  IS, I  14,1  9,2  13,0  10,9 
1%0  11.2  ·~.7  8,5  18,8  13,7  15.4  16,1  10,7  13,9  12,6 
l'nt-go  8,7  14,6  8,0  10,4  10,3  12,8  11,6  8,6  12.5  10,2 
1981  13,8  19,3  10,4  16,3  16,3  17,3  20,6  12,2  14,8  14,8 Table  5 
Changes  in  eKchange  rates within the  EMS 
(a)  Realignments  in  central  rates, 
percentage  change  against  the  group  of  currencies 
whose  bilateral  parities were  not  changed 
Dates  of  realignments 
24  30  22  5  22  14  21 
September  November  March  October  February  June  March 
1979  1979  1981  1981  1982  1982  1983 
BFR/LFR  -8,5  +1,5 
DKR  -2,9  -4,8  -3  +2,5 
OM  +2  +5,5  +4,25  +5,5 
FF  -3  -5,75  -2,5 
IRL  -3,5 
LIT  -6  -3  -2,75  -2,5 
HFL  +5,5  +4,25  +3,5 
(b)  Variations  in effective exchange  rates  ( 1) 
relative  to  EMS  partners, 
annual  percentages 
1979  ~(2)  1980  1981  1982<2> 
1973  1979  1979  1980  1981 
B  +1,3  -3,1  -0,1  -0,4  - 9,1 
DK  -1,1  -3,9  -6,8  +0,1  - 4,7 
0  +4,6  +4,7  +1,2  +3,0  +10,0 
F  -3,0  -2,2  +1,0  -1,1  - 6,4 
IRL  -6,1  +0,2  +0,1  -0,5  + 0,9 
I  -9,4  -4,8  -3,5  -5,0  - 5,9 
NL  +1,7  +2,6  +0,7  +0,7  + 6,5 
UK  (3)  -4,9  +6,5  +9,9  +9,9  - 0,0 
(1)  Export  weighting,  variable  from  year  to year  until  1977. 
(2)  Forecasts:  economic  budgets,  May  1982.  The  realignment  of  central  rates 
on  14  June  1982  is  taken  into account. 
<3>  In  relation to  Community  countries. 
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Source:  Eurostat  and  Commission  departments,  European  Economy  No  12,  July  1:982,Crevised) Table  6 
Adj-.nent of relative thanges I  in costs and prices ill relation to EMS partRen 
Country 
B 
DK 
0 
F 
IRL 
I 
NL 
UK4 
(a) Rdauve chanae an  unit labour ~~~2 
-- whole economy; indices 
m common currency 
Relattw level  Relative leYel 
10  197!1  in  1982l 
( ""  available margms  ( =  marlins stiU 
relative to  available relative 
different base  to differeat base 
penods =  100)  penods  - 100) 
1978  197!1  197!1  1982  1982  1982  mo  061-70  0  68-72  1970  06i'=7o  0'6iT2 
) 17,8  111.4  115,1  99,0  93,9  96,9 
102,7  104,8  102,7  90,3  92,1  90,3 
99,1  106,4  103,0  94,6  102,0  98,8 
92,6  81,1  89.3  103,0  90,2  99,3 
77,9  74,8  82,2  103,0  99,0  106,2 
82.7  81,4  82,7  95,1  94,2  95,8 
112.9  121,7  ) 11,5  I 12,6  121,3  111,2 
76,3  69,8  77.7  112,2  102,6  114,2 
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(b) Relati'ft chaase 1a GOP pric;c: 
iodic:es 1n common wrreac:y 
RdatiYC level  Relative level 
in  1978  lh  1982) 
( •  available margins  ( "'  IDUJins still 
rclatne to  available relative 
diffcreat base  to ddTcreftt  base 
periods  ...  100)  periodl  - 100) 
1978  1978  1978  1982  1982  1932 
ffiO  0'6iTo" ~  1970  061-70  0  68-72 
105,6  102,5  105,7  87,8  85,2  87.9 
110,2  112,5  110,3  100,7  102,9  100,8 
104,0  111,2  107,2  101,9  109,0  105,0 
92,9  83,3  89,9  98,6  88,4  95.4 
82,6  80,1  83,4  110,4  107,0  111,5 
77,6  76,5  78,0  90,9  89,6  91,4 
119,1  123,2  I 16,3  121,2  125,2  I 18,3 
80,1  71,4  80,6  117,8  107,9  118,5 
I  Eaport  ~~~e~pliftS. variable from  year to year unlll  19n. 
2  I  Ada of eompensauon of employees per employee dtvidod by the index of productivity per pcrsoa employed. 
l  Forecuta: econonue  bud~ts. May  1982. The realignments of 14 June 1982 arc taken mto aoc:ount. 
4  Ch••  n:lauve to Communuy couotna. 
Sowt.1: Eurostat and Commission departments. 
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1lJill-70  11.0  7,6  3,1  2,5 
11,171-RO  19,1  4,7  13,8  13,6 
19XO  20.3  1,7  18,4  23,7 
1981  18,9  -0,7  19,7  24,4 
19R2  I  :!2.5  0,7  21.7  23,0 
Jl)l'\3  l  23.0  1,9  20,7  21,0 
Prclnmn;1ry estrmatc ••f I  he <  'omm~>ston aervtces on the baaia of pi'CKnt or 11ntieipated policies. 
".,  ch.tnl(c uver JHevrou»  rc;ru~. <&nnuaJ  nne. 
End of ye;ar. 
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Jlt"l  au:ount  l(uvernrncnt  ,upplv  ll 
cmph>ycc  "' o.ll.tnl-e  h.tlan.:e  growth  l.tt~"" 
of p.ryrncnl!l  :\.12  I  luHc 
---------·-- ..  l  '',.GDP  ".GOP 
9,8  -3.1  17,6 
18,3  -2,7  23,8 
16,2  -0,9  24,7  2.8 
27,1  -2,2  -10,1  34,3  3.1 
27,4  -2,4  -9,2  29,1  3.8 
21,0  -2,3  -8,6  23.0  4,0 - 43  -
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19.58  3.9  2,9  2,5  -0.4  - t:6  2,0  4.5  1.7  1,7 
l9S9  0,7  0.4  1.6  :  l.S  -6,4  . 2.S  4,8  0,7  1,5 
1960  0,7  -1.6  1.6  -2.9  1,.5  -0.1  0,8  3.0  ·-1.0  0,7 
t9ftl  0,3  -2,0  l,O  -2.2  l,l  0',2  1.2  1,4  o.o  0.7 
1%2  0.7  -3.4  -0.1  -1.6  I,&  -1.8  0.6  1.1  0.4  0,4 
tw.l  -0,4  0,1  0,2  -2.2  0~,3  -2~8  -1.4  0,7  0,3  -0,0 
I~M  0.2  -2,4  0.2  -4,3  -0.3  -3.5  1,1  -1.1  -1.3  -0.3 
1965  0,6  -1,8  -1,3  -s.s  0,8  -4,4  3.6  0,1  -0.2  0.1 
1966  -0,1  -1.9  0,3  -2,0  0,1  -1,6  3.2  -1.0  0.1  0.-l 
1967  1,2  -2,4  2,2  -2.2  0,0  1,4  2.2  -0.3  -0.9  0.7 
1961  1,4  -1,7  2,3  -3.6  -o.s  -1,3  3,3  0.3  -0,8  0,8 
1969  1,8  -2.8  1,4  -4,0  -1,1  -4,8  2.7  0.3  0.7  0.6 
1970  3.2  -3.~  0,6  -3.1  0,1  -4,0  1.2  -1,5  1,3  0,5 
1961·70  0,9  -2.2  0,7  -3.1  0.2  -2,3  1.8  o.o  -o.o  0.4 
1971"  2.3  -2.4  0.4  -l,S  0,6  -3,8  1,8  -0.3  1,8  0,8 
1972  3.9  -0,4  0,4  -l,l  o,s  -2.2  1,6  3.0  0.2  o.s 
1973  2.8  -1.7  !.3  -3~8  -0~2  -3,1  -1,8  4,0  -2.0  0.0 
1974  1,7  -3,1  2.6  -3.3  -2.3  -9.4  -4.7  3.2  -4.6  -1.0 
197S  0,7  -I.S  0,9  -4,2  -o.o  -0,2  -0.2  2,5  -2,0  -o.o 
1976  0,4  -4,9  ~8  -2.6  -l,.S  -3,4  -I,S  3.2  -1.7  -0.5 
1977  -o.s  -4.0  0,9  . -2.7  -0,7 .  -2,8  1,2  0,8  -0.1  0.1 
1978  -0.7  -2,7  I,S  -2.3  0,6  -3,1  2,4  -o.s  0,4  0.8 
1979  -1,8  -4,S  -0.6  -2.9  0,1  -9.8  1,7  -1.3  -o.o  -0.4 
1980  -4.2  -3.8  -1.8  -0..9  -1,4  -8,4  -2,5  -1,4  1.2  -1.4 
1971-80  o,s  -2.9.  0,6  -2.7  -0,4  -4~  -0,2  1,3  -0,7  -O.l 
1981  -4,4  -3,2  -1.1  -2.2  -2.0  -13.2  -2.3  2,3  2,4  -0.8 
(1982)  -3,2  -4,1  0,0  -2.4  -2,6  -9,0  -1,3  4,0  0,8  -0.7 
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1958  .  S4.83SO  7.57~7  4,60614  ]2,9010  4.61264  0~391678  685.438  4,1674S  0.391671  1.09670 
19$9  52.8101  7.29SlS  4.43605  31,6863  S,214S4  0,377215  660,126  4,01357  0,37121S  1,0S621 
. ·a960  52.8101  7.l953S  4,43ft05  31,6863  S.214S4  0,37721.5  660.126  4,01357  o.37nJs  1,05621 
.......... 
:  -1961  53,W.7  7.37224  4.30742  32.0202  S.269~  0,381191  667.084  3,898S4  0.381191  1,06734 
1962  s~  ...  ,cu  7J8928  4.27921  32.0943  5,28168  0,:482073  668.626  3.87268  0.38207)  1,06981 
1963  53.4901  7,38921  4.27921  32,0943  5.28168  G.382073  668,626  3.87268  0.382073  1,06981  . 
·1964  53.4901  7.3~928  4.27921  32.0943  5,28168  0.382073  668.626  3,87268  0,38207)  1,06981 
1965  S3.4901  7.38928  4.27921  32.()9.13  5..2&168  0.382073  668,626  3,87268  0,382073  1,06981 
1966  53.4901  7,38928  4.27921  32.0943  .5,28168  o.J82073  668,626  3,87268  0.182073  1,06981 
.1967  53.2404  7.42193  4.25924  31.9446  S,2S703  0.387652  665,506  3,85461  0,)87652  I,OMR2 
l%8  51,4442  7,71663  4,11554  30,8667  5.07967  0,428702  643.052  3.724S6  0,42K702  1,02HH9 
1969  .51.1093  7,66640  4.02622  30.66.57  5,29027  0,42S912  638,866  3,70032  0.425911  1.02219 
1970  51.1116  7,66675  3,74138  30,6661  5,67767  0,425931  638.895  3,70049  0,42S931  1,02223 
1971  50.8663  7.75264  3,64566  31.4328  5,mJ4  0,428583  647,414  3.6S7SO  0,428583  ),04776 
1972  49J611  7,78909  3.57681  33.6$33  5,65111  0~448941  654,264  3.59991  0,448941  1,12178 
)973  47.8009  7.41598  3,27644  36.9519  5,46nS  O.j()2J21  716.460  3,42853  0,50232~  1,23173 
1974  46.3994  7,25927  3,08352  35.7810  5,73386  0,.509803  775.743  3,20224  0,509803  1,19270 
1975  45.5690  7,12266  3,04939  39,9941  5.31923  0.560026  809.S4.S  3,13490  0,560026  1,24077 
1~76  -1).1654  6.76176  2.8JS4S  40,R842  S>M86  0.621578  930,1SO  2.95.SIS  0.621578  1,11805 
1977  40JtS26  6,85567  2,64831  42,0353  S,60607  0,653701  I 006.785  2,80010  0,653701  1,14112 
1CJ78  .tO.OM I  7,01946  2  •  .SS608  46,7829  S,73984  0.663898  I 080,216  2,75410  0,663920  1.27410 
1979  40.1651  7.20912  2.51088  50,7738  .5,82946  0,669492  I 138.498  2,74865  0.64MOl  1..37065 
19SO  40.5979  7,&2737  2.52422  .59,3228  5.86896  0,676007  I 189,205  2,76028  0,,8498  1.39233 
1911  41.2946  7,9n56  2.51391  61,6241  6..03993  0,691031  I 263,180  2,77511  0.5~]120  1.1164S 
(1982)  .&4.4227  I.Jl66S  2.39150  64.7323  6.36781  0,61920)  I 318,499  2,63548  0,5S8673  0.99710 "'i~NE}' 
G R E E C E  CONTENTS  OF  EUROPEAN  COfJMISSION  PROPOSALS  IN  REPLY  TO  "GREEK 
MEMORANOOW'  - SIGNIFICANt  CONC£SStoNS  FOR  TAXES  AND 
AODif10NAL  fUNDING 
.  the 
Europedn  Commission  has  replied  to  the  Greek  memorandum  of March  1982  by  a  series of 
proposals  to  the  Council,  the  aim  of  which  is  : 
- to  help  the  Greek  government  and  people  to  achieve  a  thoroughgoing  transformation  of 
the  country's  economic  structures, 
- to  speed  up  Greece's  integration  in  the Community. 
The  proposed  measures  come  under  Community  refulations, with  certain provisional 
derogations  where  appropriate.  the  only  really s1gn1  1cant derogation  is  that concerning 
taxation arranr.ements.  In  practice the Commission  has  abandoned  the  idea  of  actin  a ainst 
tril?  Lr('ek  lnfnnC~ements un  er  rt1c  e  o  e  rea  y  w 1C  s  ates  t  a  axes  on 
lmported  products  cannot  be  htgher  than  those  on  stmtlar national  products),  provided 
that a qradual  timetable  is drawn  u  for  removal  of  these  infrin ements  and  for  the  intro-
rluction  ot  VAl.  EOR  wou  potn  out  a  tn  1s  1e  t  e  1scnm1na  tons  app  1e 
by  Gr·cec~ art!  quite  considerable  i  in  point of  fact,  the  taxes  imposed  on  imported  pro-
ducts  amount  to  customs  duties.  The  Commission  views  this  problem  in  the  context  of the 
overall  reform  of  the  tax  system  in  Greece,  which  requires a  certain  amount  of  time.  In 
practice,  the  Commission  is  introducing a  sort of  special  transitional  period  for applica· 
tion of  Article 95.  The  timetable  to  be  laid  down  has  not  yet  been  established  ;  it is 
possible that  in  the  end  it will  be  negotiated  {at  least where  the  new  date  for  introducing 
VAT,  instead  of  1  January  1984- now  abandoned- is concerned)  in  the  Council,  in  the 
context of  the  examination  of  the  Commission's  proposals.  Introduction of  VAT  should 
.-.f; .e  t.~  ~Pt:1e the  taxation  problem  at the  root,  since  VAT  1s  designed  to  replace  a11  the 
c-trcr  tm:Jort  taxes. 
The  Commission's  reply  contains  two  major  sections  : 
A.  "lnteqrated Mediterranean  pro  rammes
11  and  other measures  a 1  read  arranged.  In  recent 
mor.t  s  var1ous  measures  ave  een  ta  en  or  reece  s  ene  1 ,  par  1cu  ar y  in  the agricul-
tural  sector  (FEOGA  intervention  rate, special  fundings,  etc.)  and  Greece  should  benefit 
ln  special  fashion  from  certain  programmes  that are  already a matter of general  acceptance, 
~uc~ as  the  first programme  of structural  aids  for  fisheries.  In  addition  and  above  all, 
the  Commission  considers  that its  proposal  concerning  "integrated Mediterranean  prograrrmes" 
constitutes a direct and  satisfactory response  to  a  large  number  of  the structural  ques-
t,ons which  arise  in  the  memorandum.  Pending  further detailed discussion  of  the  contents 
of  these 
11programmes"  (which  wtll  affect  Italy, Franceand  Greece),  EUROPE  would  point out 
that  the  funding  earmarked  for Greece  under  this  headin  amounts  to 2,542  ECUs  for  the 
pct·iod  19  ~  ,  o  w 1c  ,  m1  1on  or agncu  ture,  m1  ton  or  orestry,  139 
~,~lion for  fisheries,  1,048  million for actions  other than  the  above. 
6.  New  proposals.  There  are  a  large  number  of these.  The  principal  ones  relate to the 
·follow1ng  potnts  :  · 
1)  Five-Year .Plan  - Major  Projects.  In  June  1982,  the  Commission  welcomed  the fact that 
the Greek  Governemnent  had  1n  preparation a  five-year  plan  for economic  development  and 
the  restructuring  of  the  Greek  economY.  In  the course  of  the mission  exercise,  the 
Greek  Authorities  informed  the  Commtssion  about  the  major  projects  envisaged  in  this plan. 
ihe Com'Tiission  has  now  decided  that when  certain of  those  projects  have  been  presented  and 
exam1ned,  it will  be  prepared  if necessary  to propose  to the Council  that special  measures 
should  be  added  to  the  intervention of  existin  Community  instruments. 
~Qr1cu1ture.  ne  omm1ss1on  proposes  the  extension  to t  e entire rural  area  of  Greece 
of  a  ser1es  ot  measures  concerning  irrigation. forestry and  infrastructure. 
Both  the  Commission  and  the Greek  Authorities  are  seriously concerned  about  the 
insufficiencies  of  the Greek  system  of  quality control:  the Commission  now  proposes 
exceptiona11y  a measure  aiming  at the development  of  the  means  necessary  for  an  increase 
in  the  number  of  rhythm  of  quality controls.  This  will  involve· the  hiring  and  training 
:· ·  ·  ' ;  ::.  ~  : t y  :: c-n  t r o  1 person n  e  1  . 
3)  trrlploy;,erlt  ana  Social  Policy.  The  Commission  wishes  to assist the  Greek  Authorities 
to moaern1se  tne  tra1n1ng  system  in  Greece.  The  Commission  proposes.financial  aid  for 
the  construction  and  equ1pment  of training centres  in  urban  areas  (similar action  is 
already  envisaged  for  other areas  in  the  Mediterranean  Integrated  Programme  for  Greece). 
The  Co,TII11ission  also  proposes  financhl  assistance  towards  the  improvement  of 
the  social  andprofessional  rehabilitation system  for  certain categories of  handicapped 
people.  This  will  involve  the  building and  equipment  of  hospitals  and  the  introduction 
of  modern  techniques. 
These  actions which  will  have  a duration of 4 years  are  both  intended  to  put 
Greece  in  a  position to make  greater use  of the  resources  of  the  Social  Fund. 
4)  Transport 
- Intrastructure.  The  Commission  proposes  for the years  1984/85  a  substantial  measure. 
1n  favour  of  those  transport infrastructure projects which  have  a  Community  interest, 
which  is to  be  added  to the experimental  programme  on  transport infrastructure of 
the  Community.  • •• /...  L 
·• 
- 44  -'  - Transport  Costs.  In  the  course  of the missions,  the  Gr~ek Authorities  ~resented 
a seras of  demands  arising from  the  cost of  transport  1n  the Greek  agncultural 
sector created  by  the  geographical  position  and  configuration  of  Greece.  The 
Commission  believes  that  some  of  these  demands  require Community  action  pending 
the development  of  transport  infrastructure.  The  Commission  undertakes  to  propose 
a  number  of  actions  for a  limited  period  aimed  at reducing  the effects on  product-
ivity of  these  specific Greek  circ.umstances. 
5)  Environment.  Given  the  enormity  of  the  pollution and  conge~tion problem  of  Athens,  a 
solutton w1rr-only  be  found  through  a  long-term action  involving  a  coordinated  approach 
to  its  r.~ny dimensions.  The  Commission  ;~  ~l~eady helping  to  ~evelop a  ~asis  f~r such 
an  approach  through  the  financing  of  feas1b1l1ty  studies  and  p1lot exper1ments  1n Athens. 
The  Commission  will  continue  to  cooperate with  the Greek  Authorities  in  the  search  for 
a comprehensive  action  programme.  When  this  policy  has  been  establ~shed, trye  ~omm~ssion 
will  furthermore  present  proposals  for appropriate Community  partic1pation  1n  1ts  lmple-
mentation. 
b)  rt~search and  technology.  The  Commission  stresses that a  key  factor  in  the Greek 
stra~0gy, on  wh1ch  the  success  of  the  country's  policy where  science  is concerned  largely 
depends,  is  the  need  for  equipment  and  facilities.  A special  effort on  the  part of 
Greece  will  be  able  to  be  supported  by  the  ex1st1ng  Community  instruments  for financing. 
In  addition,  the  EEC  can  take  part in  carrying  out  specific research  contracts,  and  the 
Commission  states  that a  "Community  support  action"  could  be  undertaken  on  the basis  of 
requests  to  be  made  by  the  Greek  authorities. 
7)  Enerqy.  All  the  Greek  projects  under  the  five-year  plan  are  perfectly in  keeping  with 
the  goa1s  and  guidelines  of the  Community  energy  strategy.  As  a result the  Community 
instru~ents have  a  role  to  play  (and  in certain cases  are  already  playing  it).  It all 
depeMs  on  the Greeks  submitting  the  applications.  Nor  should  it be  forgotten  that 
the  "integrated Mediterranean  programmes"  include a  series of fundings  for projects  in 
the  field of  renewable  energies  :  solar energy,  wind  energy,  Bioma~s, hydro-electric 
power. 
8}  fisheries.  The  Commission  intends  to give  priority to  the Greek  requests  in connection 
with  restructuring,  in  the  framework  of  the  EEC  interim action to assist coastal  fishing 
and  aquaculture  (Greece  has  so  far not  benefitted  from  this :programme  to any  significant 
extent).  In  addition,  the  Commission  is to  study  the  possibility of  intervention to 
assist the  Greek  fleet,  even  where  boats  less  than  18  metres  long  are concerned. 
9)  admin;strative assistance.  Welcoming  the  Greek  efforts designed  to modernize  its 
admin1strat1on  and  to  promote  training of qualified  offici~ls, and  its intention of 
setting up.  to this end,  a  .. national  school  of administratfon".  the Conmission  1s  to 
propose  a  specific  EEC  contribution  in  favour  of  this latter.institution, under  the 
heading  "implementation  of  Conmunity  policies  in Greece". 
Will  the  measures  planned  suffice to enable  Gr~ece to respect and  implement 
all  aspects  of  Commun1ty  leg1slat1on  ?  ----
The  European  Commission  considers that the various  actions  envisaged  to assist 
Greece  should  enable  it to gradually  respect and  implement  all  aspects  of Community  legis-
lation.  It bases  tl:is  attitude on  the assumption  that such  is the will  of  the Athens 
qovernment  and  that the  current  infringements  are  the  result of  obJeCtlve  d1ff1cult1es. 
ine  Comm1ssion  says  that it is aware  that the  respect  of Community  obligations  1n  some 
cases  presents  particular difficulties  ;  but  the Greeks  have  an  obligation to  solve 
these difficulties and  this is an  essential  element  of  the  process  of Greek  integration 
in  the  Community.  The  reply to  the  memorandum  mentions  two  areas  : 
a)  taxation.  The  Commiggon  is considering drawing  up  a  fixed  timetable  for  adaptation 
of tn~  system  to Community  standards.  This  timetable w1ll  be  drawn  up  so  as  to 
provide  a  solid basis with  a view  to  aligning  as  soon  as  possible the Greek  and  Community 
systems  ;  it will  also  take  adequate  account  of the economic  problems  exper;enced  by 
G~:--ec~·  anj  the  practical  difficulties  involved  in  the major  changes  which  are  required 
to  th~ Greek  tax  system. 
b)  state aids.  The  Commission  confirms  that the decisions  it has  taken  in  application 
of  tne Treaty  are not  ri~id. 
In  add1t1on  to  t  ese  two  areas  (discriminatory taxation, see preceding  page  ; 
aids  to  sectors  in  difficulties), there are others  in which.Greece  is failing  to  respect 
Community  standards,  and  in  particular, exchange  controls,  and  public markets. 
L 
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G R E E C E  CONTENTS  OF  EUROPEAN  COr+1ISSION  PROPOSALS  IN  REPLY  TO  "GREEK 
MERORANDOM"  - SIGNIFICANT  CONC£Sst0Ns  FoR  TAXES  AND 
AOOitioNAL  FUNDING 
. the 
Europedn  Commission  has  replied  to  the  Greek  memorandum  of March  1982  by  a  series of 
proposals  to  the  Council,  the  aim  of which  is  : 
- to help  the  Greek  government  and  people  to  achieve  a  thoroughgoing  transformation  of 
the  country's  economic  structures,  . 
- to  speed  up  Greece's  integration  in  the  Community. 
The  proposed  measures  come  under  Community  retulations, with  certain provisional 
derogations  where  appropriate.  The  only  really s1gn1  1cant  derogation  is  that concerning 
taxation arranGements.  In  practice  the  Commission  has  abandoned  the  idea  of  actin  a ainst 
ffie  urt>el  wf n nr]cments  un  er  rt1 c  e  o  e  rea  w 1  c  s  ates  t  a  axes  on 
1n~ortea pro  uc  s  canna  e  1g  er  an  ose  on  s1m1  ar national  products),  provided 
that a qrddual  timetable  is drawn  u  for  removal  of  these  infrin ements  and  for  the  intro-
rluction  or  VAl.  £OR  wou  po1n  out  a  1n  1s  1e  t  e  1scr1m1na  1ons  app  1e 
by  Gr·cec~  ar~ quite considerable  ;  in  point of  fact,  the  taxes  imposed  on  imported  pro-
ducts  amount  to  customs  duties.  The  Commission  views  this  problem  in  the  context  of the 
overall  reform  of  the  tax  system  in  Greece,  which  requires a  certain  amount  of  time.  In 
practice,  the  Commission  is  introducing  a  sort of  special  transitional  period  for applica-
tion of  Article 95.  The  timetable  to  be  laid  down  has  not  yet  been  established;  it·1s 
possible that in  the  end  it will  be  negotiated  (at least where  the  new  date  for  introducing 
VAT,  instead  of  1 January  1984- now  abandoned- is concerned)  in the  Council,  in  the 
context of  the  examination  of  the  Comrnission•s  proposals.  Introduction of  VAT  should 
·.c .e  to  ~Pt:1e the  taxation  problem  at the  root,  since  VAT  1s  designed  to  replace  a11  the 
c-t..rcr  tm:Jort  tdxes. 
The  Commission•s  reply  contains  two  major  sections  : 
A.  .. InteQrated  Mediterranean  pro  rammes
11  and  other measures  a  1  read  arranged.  In  recent 
mor.t  s  VGrlous  measures  ave  een  ta en  or  reece  s  ene  1 ,  par  1cu  ar y in  the  agricul-
tural  sector  (FEOGA  intervention  rate,  special  fundings,  etc.)  and  Greece  should  benefit 
1n  special  fashion  from  certain programmes  that are already a matter  of  general  acceptance, 
~uc~ as  the  first programme  of  structural  aids  for  fisheries.  In  addition  and  above  all, 
the  Commission  considers  that its proposal  concerning  "integrated Mediterranean  programmesM 
constitutes a direct and  satisfactory response  to  a  large  number  of  the structural  ques-
t,ons  which  arise  in  the  memorandum.  Pending  further detailed discussion  of  the  contents 
of  these 
11programmes"  (which  w1ll  affect  Italy, Franceand  Greece),  EUROPE  would  point out 
that  the  funding  earmarked  for Greece  under  this headin  amounts  to  2,542  ECUs  for  the 
pc•·iod  19  _  ,  o  w ~c  ,  m1  1on  or agncu  ture,  m1  1on  or  orestry,  139 
~,~lion for  fisheries,  1,048  million for actions  other than  the  above. 
6.  New  proposals.  There  are  a  large  number  of these.  The  principal  ones  relate to the 
·follow1ng  po1nts  :  · 
1}  Five-Year ,Plan  - Ma  or Projects.  In  June  1982,  the  Commission  welcomed  the fact that 
the·  ree  overnemnen  a  1n  preparation a five-year  plan  for economic  development  and 
the  restructuring  of  the  Greek  economy.  In  the course  of  the mission  exercise.  the 
Gr~ek Authorities  informed  the  Comm1ssion  about  the  major  projects envisaged  in  this  plan. 
The  Comonission  has  now  decided  that when  certain of  those  projects  have  been  presented  and 
exam1ned,  it will  be  prepared  if necessary  to  propose  to the  Council  that special  measures 
should  be  added  to  the  intervention of  existin  Conmunity  instruments. 
qr1cu•ture.  ne  omm1SS1on  proposes  t  e  extension tote entire rural  area  of  Greece 
of  a  ser1es  or  measures  concerning  irrigation, forestry and  infrastructure. 
eoth  the  Commission  and  the  Greek  Authorities  are  seriously concerned  about  the 
insufficiencies  of  the Greek  system  of  quality control:  the Commission  now  proposes 
exceptionally a measure  aiming  at the development  of  the  means  necessary  for  an  increase 
in  the  number  of  rhythm  of  quality controls.  This  will  involve- the  hiring  and  training 
·  .. ·  '~::  ~  >ty  c~ntro  1 personne 1  . 
3)  Emoloy~cnt ana  Social  Policy.  The  Commission  wishes  to assist the  Greek  Authorities 
to moaern1se  tne  tra1n1ng  system  in  Greece.  The  Commission  proposes  financial  aid for 
the  ccnstruction  and  equ1pment  of training centres  in  urban  areas  (similar action  is 
already  envlSJqed  for  other areas  in  the  Mediterranean  Integrated  Programme  for  Greece). 
The  Co,llffiission  also  proposes  financial  assistance  towards  the  improvement  of 
the  social  andprofessional  rehabilitation system  for  certain categories of  handicapped 
people.  This  will  involve  the  building and  equipment  of  hospitals  and  the  introduction 
of  modern  techniques. 
These  actions which  will  have  a duration of 4 years  are  both  intended  to  put 
Greece  in  a  position  to  make  greater use  of the  resources  of  the  Social  Fund. 
4)  Transport 
- Inrrastructure.  The  Commission  proposes  for the years  1984/85  a  substantial  measure. 
1n  favour  of  those  transport infrastructure projects which  have  a  Community  interest. 
which  is to  be  added  to the experimental  programme  on  transport infrastructure of 
the  Community.  • •• /...  L 
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- 44  -- Transport  Costs.  In  the  course of the missions.  the Greek  Authorities  presented 
a senes of  demands  arising  from  the  cost of  transport in  the Greek  agricultural 
sector created  by  the  geographical  position and  configuration  of Greece.  The 
Commission  believes  that  some  of these  demands  require Community  action  pending 
the  development  of  transport  infrastructure.  The  Commission  undertakes  to  propose 
a  number  of  actions  for a  limit~d period  aimed  at reducing  the  effects on  product-
ivity of  these specific Greek  circumstances. 
5)  Environment.  Given  the  enormity  of  the  pollution and  cong~tion problem  of  Athens,  a 
soluti0ii'Wl.TI"only  be  found  through  a  long-term action  involving  a coordinated  approach 
to  its  r.~ny d1mensions.  The  Commission  is already  helping  to develop  a basis  for  such 
an  approach  through  the  financing  of  feasibility studies  and  pilot experiments  in  Athens. 
The  Commission  will  continue  to  cooperate with  the Greek  Authorities  in  the  search  for 
a comprehensive  action  programme.  When  this  policy  has  been  established,  the Commission 
will  furthermore  present  proposals  for appropriate  Community  participation in its  imple-
mentation. 
6)  rt'Search  and  techno 1  ogy.  The  Commission  stresses_ that a  key  factor  in  the Greek 
stra:~gy, on  wh1ch  the  success  of  the country's policy where  science  is concerned  largely 
depends,  is  the  need  for  equipment  and  facilities.  A spechl  effort on  the  part of 
Greece  will  be  able  to  be  supported  by  the  ex1st1ng  Community  instruments  for financing. 
In  addition,  the  £EC  can  take  part in  carrying  out  specific research  contracts, and  the 
Commission  states  that a  "Community  support  action  ..  could  be  undertaken  on  the basis of 
requests  to  be  made  by  the  Greek  authorities. 
7}  Energy.  All  the  Greek  projects  under  the  five-year  plan  are  perfectly in  keeping  with 
the-goaTS and  guidelines  of  the  Community  energy  strategy.  As  a  result the  Community 
instru~ents have  a  role  to  play  (and  in  certain cases  are already  playing  it).  It all 
depen-js  on  the Greeks  submitting  the  a ppli cations.  Nor  should  it be  forgotten  that 
the  .. integrated Mediterranean  programmes"  include a  series of fundings  for  projects  in 
the  field of  renewable  energies  :  solar energy,  wind  energy,  Bioma~s, hydro-electric 
power.  .~ 
8)  fisheries.  The  Commission  intends  to give  priority to  the Greek  requests  in connection 
with  restructuring,  in  the  framework  of the  EEC  interim action to assist coastal  fishing 
and  aquaculture  (Greece  has  so  far not  benefitted from  this programme  to any  significant 
extent).  In  addition,  the  Commission  is to  study  the  possibility of  intervention to 
assist the  Greek  fleet,  even  where  boats  less  than  18  metres  long  are concerned. 
9)  administrative assistance.  Welcoming  the  Greek  efforts designed  to modernize  1ts 
admin1strat1on  and  to  promote  training of qualified officials, and  its intention of 
setting up,  to this end,  a  "national  school  of administration",  the  Co~~~nission  1s  to 
propose  a  specific  EEC  contribution  in  favour  of this latter institution, under  the 
heading  "implementation  of Conmunity  policies  in Greece". 
Will  the measures  planned  suffice to  enable  Gr~ece to respect and  implement 
all  aspects  of  Commun1ty  leg1slat1on  ? 
The  European  Commission  considers  that the various  actions  envisaged  to assist 
Greece  should  enable  it to gradually respect and  implement  all  aspects  of Community  legis-
lation.  It bases  U.is  attitude on  the assumption  that such  fs  the will  of the Athens 
oovernment  and  that the current  infringements  are  the  result of  obJect1ve  d1ff1cult1es. 
ine  Cornm1ssion  says  that it is aware  that the  respect of Community  obligations  in  some 
cases  presents  particular difficulties  ;  but  the Greeks  have  an  obligation to solve 
these  difficulties and  this is an  essential  element  of  the process  of Greek  integration 
in  the Community.  The  reply to  the  memorandum  mentions  two  areas  : 
a)  taxation.  The  Commi~on is considering drawing  up  a  fixed  timetable for  adaptation 
of tn~  system  to Community  standards.  This  timetable w1ll  be  drawn  up  so  as  to 
provide  a  solid basis with  a  view  to  aligning  as  soon  as  possible the Greek  and  Community 
systems  ;  it will  also  take adequate  account  of  the economic  problems  experienced  by 
Gr~ec~ anj  the  practical difficulties  involved  in  the  major  changes  which  are required 
to  th~ Greek  tax  system. 
b)  state aids.  The  Commission  confirms  that the decisions  it has  taken  in  application 
of  tne  Treaty  are not  ri~id. 
In  add1t1on  to  tnese  two  areas  (discriminatory taxation,  see  preceding  page  ; 
aids  to  sectors  in  difficulties), there are others  in which  Greece  is failing  to respect 
Community  standards,  and  in  particular, exchange  controls,  and_  public  markets. 
L 
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